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TOXIC SUBSTANCES LITIGATION IN THE FOURTH
CIRCUIT
Francis E. McGovern*
I. INTRODUCTION
Personal injuries caused by toxic substances' have generated
problems of major concern to our social, political and legal sys-
tems. Reports in the news media concerning harm caused by toxic
substances and expressions of public awareness of potential dan-
gers associated with exposure to toxic substances are common-
place.2 Legislatures, 3 administrative agencies 4 and courts5 at both
* Associate Dean and Professor of Law, Cumberland School of Law, Samford University.
B.A., 1967, Yale University; J.D., 1973, University of Virginia. The author wishes to express
his great appreciation to James H. Davis for his research and editorial assistance in the
preparation of this article.
1. Defining "toxic substances" is made difficult by the variety of materials which may be
harmful to the health of humans. The Virginia General Assembly provided the following
description: "any substance ... that has the capacity, through its physical, chemical or
biological properties, to pose a substantial risk of death or impairment either immediately
or overtime, to the normal functions of humans." VA. CODE ANN. § 32.1-239 (D) (Repl. Vol.
1979).
2. During the week of September 21, 1981, the New York Times reported the following
stories: Corrosion Found in Key Component in Nuclear Plants, Sept. 21, 1981 at 1, col. 1;
34 Are Hurt at Harvard as Chlorine Pipe Breaks, Sept. 22, 1981, at 10, col. 6; The Future
of Sewage Treatment, Sept. 22, 1981, at 27, col. 2; Nader Group Sues U.S. for Toxic Agent
Limit, Sept. 23, 1981, at 11, col. 1; Suit is Filed in 15 Deaths of Atom Test Workers, Sept.
24, 1981, at 10, col. 6; Free Tests Demanded for Agent Orange Exposure, Sept. 25, 1981, at
8, col. 3; Montana Backs Hunting in Dispute on Waterfowl, Sept. 26, 1981, at 6, col. 5
(birds exposed to pesticide). Also, on September 23rd, the Chemical Manufacturers Associa-
tion had an advertisement concerning the chemical industry's waste management programs.
N.Y. Times, Sept. 23, 1981, at 29, col. 4.
3. Examples of federal statutes addressing the problems resulting from exposure to toxic
substances include: National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (1976 & Supp. I
1979); Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7401 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980); Federal Environmental
Pesticide Control Act, 7 U.S.C. § 136 (1976 & Supp. II 1978); Toxic Substances Control Act,
15 U.S.C. § 2601 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980); Comprehensive Environmental Response, Coin-
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federal and state levels have begun to devote substantial energy to
pensation, and Liability Act of 1980, 42 U.S.C. § 9601 (Supp. IV 1980). For additional
federal statutes see ENVT'L REP. (BNA) (Federal Laws Index). The following legislative his-
tories of recent laws exemplify congressional inquiries into the risks associated with toxic
materials: Comprehensive Environmental Response Compensation and Liability Act of
1980, H.R. REP. No. 96-1016 (Parts I & II), 96th Cong., 2nd Sess., reprinted in [1980] U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 6119; Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act, S. REP. No. 96-548,
96th Cong., 2nd Sess., reprinted in [1980] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 6933; and Asbestos
School Hazard Detection and Control Act of 1980, S. REP. No. 96-710, 96th Cong., 2nd Sess.,
reprinted in [1980] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 1426.
The following are statutes which have been enacted by the legislatures of the states within
the jurisdiction of the United States Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals:
Maryland: Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, MD. ANN. CODE art. 43, § 187 (Repl. Vol. 1980);
Poison Law, MD. ANN. CODE art. 43, §§ 274-83 (Repl. Vol. 1980); Water Pollution Control
Law, MD. ANN. CODE art. 43, § 387 (Repl. Vol. 1980); Solid and Hazardous Waste Laws, MD.
ANN. CODE art. 43, § 394 (Repl. Vol. 1980); Air Quality Control, MD. ANN. CODE art. 43, §
690 (Repl. Vol. 1980); Environmental Noise Control, MD. ANN. CODE art. 43, § 822 (Repl.
Vol. 1980); Poison Prevention Packaging Act, MD. ANN. CODE art. 43, §§ 888-91 (Repl. Vol.
1980); Flammable Articles Act, MD. ANN. CODE art. 43, §§ 892-97 (Repl. Vol. 1980); Mary-
land Environmental Policy Act, MD. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 1-301 (1974 & Cum. Supp.
1981); Pesticide and Pest Control, MD. AGRIC. CODE ANN. § 5-101 (1974 & Cum. Supp.
1981); Water Pollution Control and Abatement, MD. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 8-1401 (1974 &
Cum. Supp. 1981)(statutory definitions), § 8-1406 (1974 & Cum. Supp. 1981)(emergency re-
sponse to oil spills), § 8-1413.2 (Cum. Supp. 1981)(safe disposal of designated hazardous
substances); Statement of public policy concerning wetlands, MD. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 9-
102 (1974 & Cum. Supp. 1981).
North Carolina: N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-284.2 (Repl. 1981)(prohibiting dumping of toxic
substances); Biological Organism Act, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 106-65.42 (Repl. 1978); Food, Drug
and Cosmetic Act, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 106-120 (Repl. 1978); Environmental Policy Act of
1971, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 113A-1 (Repl. 1978 & Cum. Supp. 1981); Solid Waste Management,
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 130-166.16 (Repl. 1981 & Supp. 1981); Water and Air Resources, N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 143-211 (Repl. 1978 & Cum. Supp. 1981)(includes oil pollution control at §§
143-215.75 to .102 (Repl. 1978 & Cum. Supp. 1981) and air pollution control at §§ 143-
215.105 to .114 (Repl. 1978 & Cum. Supp. 1981).
South Carolina: Hazardous Substance Act, S.C. CODE § 23-39-10 (1976 & Cum. Supp.
1980); Drug Act, S.C. CODE § 39-23-10 (1976); labels for poisons and controlled substances,
S.C. CODE § 44-53-10 (1976); Safe Drinking Water Act, S.C. CODE § 44-56-10 (Cum. Supp.
1981); Pesticide Control Act, S.C. CODE § 46-13-10 (1976 & Cum. Supp. 1980); Pollution
Control Act, S.C. CODE § 48-1-10 (1976 & Cum. Supp. 1980); Mining Act, S.C. CODE § 48-19-
10 (1976 & Cum. Supp. 1980).
Virginia: Pesticide Law, VA. CODE ANN. § 3.1-189 (Repl. Vol. 1973 & Cum. Supp. 1981);
Food Act, VA. CODE ANN. § 3.1-386 (Repl. Vol. 1973); Hazardous Household Substances, VA.
CODE ANN. § 3.1-250 (Repl. Vol. 1973 & Cum. Supp. 1981); Air Pollution Control, VA. CODE
ANN. § 10-17.9:1 (Repl. Vol. 1978); Virginia Environmental Quality Act, VA. CODE ANN. § 10-
177 (Repl. Vol. 1978)(in furtherance of Art. XI of Constitution of Virginia); Transportation
of Hazardous Materials, VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-278.1 (Cum. Supp. 1981); Solid and Hazard-
ous Waste Management, VA. CODE ANN. § 32. 1-177 (Repl. Vol. 1979 & Cum. Supp. 1981);
Radiation Control, VA. CODE ANN. § 32.1-227 (Repl. Vol. 1979); Toxic Substance Informa-
tion Act, VA. CODE ANN. §§ 32.1-239 to -245 (Repl. Vol. 1979); Transportation of Hazardous
Radioactive Material, VA. CODE ANN. § 44-146.30 (Repl. Vol. 1981); Misbranding and
Adulterated Drugs and Cosmetics, VA. CODE ANN. § 54-524.85 (Repl. Vol. 1978); State Water
Control Law, VA. CODE ANN. § 62.1-44.2 (Repl. Vol. 1973 & Cum. Supp. 1981).
West Virginia: Pure Food and Drugs, W. VA. CODE § 16-7-1 (Repl. Vol. 1979); Air Pollu-
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addressing issues raised by exposure to toxic Substances. Scien-
tific, 6 industrial, financial,8 and legal9 communities are seeking to
tion Control, W. VA. CODE § 16-20-1 (Repl. Vol. 1979); Storage and Disposal of Radioactive
Waste Materials, W. VA. CODE § 16-27-1 (Cum. Supp. 1981); Pesticide Act, W. VA. CODE §
19-16A-1 (Repl. Vol. 1977); Water Pollution Control Act, W. VA. CODE § 20-5A-1 (Repl. Vol.
1981).
4. Federal administrative agencies have promulgated extensive regulations pertaining to
the control of toxic substances. See, e.g., NRC Packaging of Radioactive Material for Trans-
port and Transportation of Radioactive Material Under Certain Conditions, 10 C.F.R. § 71.1
(1980); OSHA Occupational Safety and Health Standards, Subpart Z - Toxic and Hazardous
Substances, 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1000 (1980); EPA National Emission Standards for Hazardous
Air Pollutants, 40 C.F.R. § 61.01 (1980); EPA Identification and Listing of Hazardous
Waste, 40 C.F.R. § 261.1 (1980).
Additionally, state agencies in the Fourth Circuit have issued regulations in an attempt to
control toxic materials:
Maryland: Dept. of Health & Mental Hygiene, Air Pollution Quality, COMAR § 10.18.01
(1980); Dept. of Nat. Resources, Water Resources Adm., Receiving Water Quality Stan-
dards, COMAR § 08.05.04.02 (1980); Dept. of Nat. Resources, Water Resources Adm., Use of
Toxic Materials for Aquatic Life Management, COMAR § 08.05.04.06 (1980); Dept. of Nat.
Resources, Control of the Disposal of Designated Hazardous Substances, COMAR § 08.05.05
(1980).
North Carolina: Dept. of Nat. Resources & Comm. Development, Air Pollution Control
Regulations, N.C. ADM. CODE, title 15, ch. 2, sub-ch. 2D (1980); Dept. of Human Resources,
Solid and Hazardous Waste Branch, Solid Waste Disposal Regulations, N.C. ADM. CODE,
title 10, sub-ch. 10C (1979).
South Carolina: Dept. of Health & Envt'l Control, Air Pollution Control Standards, Reg-
ulation 61-62.5 (1980); Pollution Control Authority, Regulation Requiring Minimum Stan-
dards for Industrial Solid Waste Disposal Sites and Facilities Regulation PC-SW-2 (1972).
Virginia: State Air Pollution Control Bd., Regulations for the Control and Abatement of
Air Pollution, Parts I through VIII (1980); State Water Control Bd., Industrial Waste Sur-
vey, Regulation No. 7 (1976); Dept. of Health, Disposal of Solid Waste (1971).
West Virginia: Air Pollution Control Comm., Administrative Regulations, ch. 16-20
(1979); State Bd. of Health, Solid Waste Disposal Regulations, ch. 1, art. 12 (1974).
5. For a good discussion of asbestos cases, see Granelli, The Asbestos Case Explosion,
Nat'l L.J., Oct. 19, 1981, at 1, col. 1.
6. In the field of epidemiology, for example, see A. LiLIENFELD & D. LILIENFELD, FouNDA-
TIONS OF EPIDEMIOLOGY (1976).
7. See, e.g., Kolojeski & Murphy, Avoiding Toxic Chemical Liability Through Preventive
Analysis, 27 RISK MANAGEMENT 12 (1980); Staggering Demand Seen for Toxicologists, 126
CHEM. WEEK 16 (1980); Verespy, Love Canal May Dump a New Role on Business, 203 IN-
DUS. WEEK 103 (1979).
8. EPA Hits Hooker with Suits Asking $118 MM for Clean Up of Hazardous Waste
Dumps, 216 CHEM. MKT. REP. 3 (1979); Gottlieb, Hazardous Waste Costs Boost Chemical
Costs, 88 PURCHASING 23 (1980); Simon, Insurers Recoil in Wake of Asbestos Claims, 13
Bus. INs. 3 (1979); Suits That are Searing Asbestos, Bus. WEEK, Apr. 13, 1981, at 166.
9. See, e.g., Baurer, Love Canal: Common Law Approaches to a Modern Tragedy, 11
ENvT'L L. 133 (1980); Van Dyke, Dalkon Shield: A "Primer" on IUD Liability, 6 W. ST. U.
L. REV. 1 (1979); Note, Inactive or Abandoned Hazardous Waste Disposal Sites: Coping
with a Costly Past, 53 S. CAL. L. REV. 1709 (1980); Comment, A Private Nuisance Ap-
proach to Hazardous Waste Disposal Sites, 7 OHIO N. U. L. REv. 86 (1980); Comment,
Catastrophic Chemical Contamination: A Response to the Michigan PBB Episode, 1978 S.
ILL. U.L.J. 223.
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deal with these problems from a number of different perspectives.
Just as terms such as "Love Canal" and "asbestosis" have been
added to the vocabulary of a generation of Americans, concepts
such as "enterprise liability"10 and "collateral estoppel"11 are de-
veloping new meanings and roles in our legal system.
In many senses lawsuits brought for damages caused by toxic
substances are not materially different from other types of product
liability suits. 12 Typically a business entity places a product into
the stream of commerce that creates an unacceptable risk of harm
and causes injury to a person. It can be argued that any differences
that exist between toxic substances cases and product liability
cases are merely differences of degree, not of kind. Toxic sub-
stances cases are further along the same continuum as product lia-
bility cases. For example, product liability cases have been distin-
guished by the mass produced nature of products and hence the
large number of persons potentially affected by those products."3
Toxic substances potentially expose an even greater number of
persons to harm.14 Product liability cases often involve a lag time
of several years between the act of a manufacturer in producing a
defective product and injury to a consumer. 15 A twenty-year lag
10. Enterprise liability was initially a proposal for reallocating the economic costs result-
ing from accidents. See Klemme, The Enterprise Liability Theory of Torts, 47 U. COLO. L.
REV. 153 (1976); O'Connell, Expanding No-Fault Beyond Auto Insurance: Some Proposals,
59 VA. L. REV. 749 (1973). Presently, the theory is being used to support the concept that
an entire industry is responsible for compensating those harmed by its products. Coggins,
Industry-Wide Liability, 13 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 980 (1979); Note, DES and a Proposed
Theory of Enterprise Liability, 46 FORDHAM L. REv. 963 (1978).
11. Traditionally, collateral estoppel has been a device for assuring judicial economy but
it now is being used as a means of lowering a plaintiff's cost of litigation and of forcing
defendants to settle claims. See Weinberger, Collateral Estoppel and the Mass Produced
Product: A Proposal, 15 NEW ENGLAND L. REv. 1 (1979).
12. Similar legal theories are used, including strict liability in tort, negligence, breach of
warranties, and breach of duty to warn or instruct. A product as defined in the Model Uni-
form Product Liability Act § 120(C), 44 Fed. Reg. 62,714, 62,717 (1979), could also be a
toxic substance within the definition in VA. CODE ANN. § 32.1-239 (E)(Repl. Vol. 1979).
13. As many as three million daughters of women who took the synthetic estrogen-type
drug DES are at risk of developing cancerous and precancerous vaginal tract abnormalities.
Note, Market Share Liability: An Answer to the DES Causation Problem, 94 HARv. L. REV.
668, 668-99 (1981).
14. As many as 2,522,000 workers are exposed annually to products containing asbestos.
NATIONAL CANCER INST., ASBESTOS: AN INFORMATION RESOURCE (1978). This figure does not
include consumers who come into contact with asbestos fibers.
15. See, e.g., General Motors Corp. v. Hopkins, 548 S.W.2d 344 (Tex. App. 1977), over-
ruled on other grounds, 584 S.W.2d 844 (Tex. 1979). See also Henderson, Coping with the
Time Dimension in Products Liability, 69 CAL. L. REv. 919 (1981).
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time would not be unusual in toxic substances cases."' Proof of a
defect in a product liability case may be difficult for a plaintiff be-
cause of a defendant manufacturer's possession of essential exper-
tise and information. 7 Proof of a defect in a toxic substances case
may be even more difficult because of a high degree of scientific
uncertainty concerning the harm caused by a toxic substance.18
On the other hand, it can be argued that there are fundamental
differences between product liability and toxic substances cases be-
cause of (1) the number of cases, 19 (2) the complexity of those
cases20 and (3) the unique characteristics of how those cases oc-
cur." These differences can be illustrated by a host of novel legal
issues that are now being considered by both federal and state
courts.
The exceptionally large number of plaintiffs and defendants in
toxic substances cases has caused mechanical problems of case
management and has involved substantial transaction costs.2 2 The
application of multi-district litigation,2 3 class actions24 and new
16. Exposure to asbestos for as short as a month may result in disease twenty years later.
Richmond, 13 CLINCAL TOXICOLOGY 641 (1978).
17. For this and other rationales behind the adoption of strict liability in tort, see Owen,
Rethinking the Policies of Strict Products Liability, 33 VAND. L. REv. 681 (1980).
18. Scientific researchers may be unable to isolate the effects of a particular substance on
humans given the multitude of materials to which people are exposed. Davis and Rail, Risk
Assessment for Disease Prevention, in STRATEGIES FOR PUBLic HEALTH 131 (Ng & Davis ed.
1981).
19. For example, in March, 1978, thirty-one suits, encompassing 123 plaintiffs, were pend-
ing in the Federal District Court for Eastern Virginia, alleging injuries due to exposure to
asbestos at the Newport News shipyards. Memorandum and Order, Bailey v. Johns-
Manville Corp., C.P. No. 77-1 (E.D. Va., filed Mar. 30, 1978). At one point in 1980, the
Federal District Court for Eastern Texas was handling the claims of 2,445 plaintiffs against
manufacturers of asbestos products. Migues v. Nicolet Indus. Inc., 493 F. Supp. 61, 64 (E.D.
Tex. 1980) rev'd in part and remanded, 662 F.2d 1182 (5th Cir. 1981).
20. Beyond the normal problems of determining causation and damages, the Newport
News asbestos cases have been complicated with conflicts over the interpretation of the
Virginia statute of limitation, by attempts to evoke admiralty jurisdiction and by manufac-
turers seeking indemnification from the United States government. See White v. Johns-
Manville Corp., 662 F.2d 234 (4th Cir. 1981); Oman v. Johns-Manville Corp., 482 F. Supp.
1060 (E.D. Va. 1980).
21. "Such claims are not only particularly easy to fabricate, but there is a great tendency
in a sufferer to ascribe, without conscious dishonesty, his illness to some cause from which
he may hope to obtain relief." Bohlen, A Problem in the Drafting of Workmen's Compensa-
tion Acts, 25 HARv. L. REV. 328, 344-45 (1911-1912).
22. See Granelli, supra note 5.
23. See In re Swine Flu Immunization Prods. Liab. Litig., 446 F. Supp. 244 (Jud. Pan.
Mult. Lit. 1978).
24. See Pruitt v. Allied Chem. Corp., 85 F.R.D. 100 (E.D. Va. 1980), decertification
granted, No. 77-0035.R (E.D. Va. May 6, 1981).
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techniques of managing discovery25 and trials26 have been hotly de-
bated issues. Collateral estoppel has been adopted in some courts
and has resulted in the rapid movement of cases.27 New methods of
organizing representation of clients's and dealing with conflicts of
interest" among counsel have become commonplace.
Decision-making by courts and juries has become exceptionally
difficult because of the complexity of factual and legal issues.
There is currently a conflict among jurisdictions on the meaning of
"occurrence" in insurance contracts.30 Judges are finding conflicts
between values of fairness and utility in fashioning legal rules,3 '
and juries are being asked to resolve factual issues that are rife
with uncertainty.32
All these unique characteristics seem to stem from the nature of
injuries caused by toxic substances. There are simply no historic
legal theories or particularistic proof available for some types of
injuries.33 Courts are being asked to develop new theories of liabil-
ity,34 to relax standards of proof,3 5 to circumvent existing bars to
25. For example, joint action judicial team was formed in connection with the Newport
News asbestos cases with judges from the federal district court and two state circuit courts.
26. See, e.g., In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 506 F. Supp. 762 (E.D.N.Y.) (serial
trials), rev'd, 635 F.2d 987 (2d Cir. 1980), review denied, 50 U.S.L.W. 3483 (U.S. Dec. 15,
1981)(No. 80-1882).
27. By removing the plaintiff's burden of proving that asbestos products are unreasonably
dangerous, trial time would be shorter since the issues were reduced to those centered solely
on the individual plaintiff (the sufficiency of his exposure and the amount of his damages).
Flatt v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 488 F. Supp. 836, 838-39 (E.D. Tex. 1980).
28. See Granelli, supra note 5.
29. For example, a law firm which was handling over 200 asbestos cases arising out of the
Newport News shipyards has been disqualified because it hired a former Justice Depart-
ment attorney, who had represented the government in the manufacturers' third-party ac-
tion seeking indemnification. The disqualification came despite assurances that the attorney
would not be involved in these cases and a waiver issued by the Justice Department. Brief
for Appellant, Greitzer & Locke v. Johns-Manville, appeal docketed, No. 81-1379 (4th Cir.
May 7, 1981).
30. See Insurance Co. of North America v. Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc., 633 F.2d 1212
(6th Cir. 1980), reh. granted, 657 F.2d 814 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 50 U.S.L.W. 3466 (U.S.
Dec. 7, 1981) (No. 81-199). See also notes 368-412 infra and accompanying text.
31. In Ferrigno v. Eli Lilly & Co., 175 N.J. Super. 551, -, 420 A.2d 1305, 1314 (1980),
the Court noted a strong policy favoring recovery by innocently injured plaintiffs against
culpable defendants regardless of inability to identify the exact source of the injuries.
32. See note 18 supra.
33. Fault-based theories may overlook the "real culprit" in toxic substance incidents - the
hazardous technology itself. Comment, Catastrophic Chemical Contamination: A Response
to the Michigan PBB Episode, 1978 S. ILL. U. L. J. 223, 230. For specific inadequacies of the
present legal system, see Soble, A Proposal for the Compensation of Victims of Toxic Sub-
stance Pollution: A Model Act, 14 HARv. J. LEG. 683 (1976-77).
34. See text accompanying notes 225 & 226 infra.
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recovery,3 6 and to allow for new indices of damages.
The development of statutes and common law to meet these new
demands placed upon the legal system forms the background to
this article. This article will also present an overview of the proce-
dural and substantive issues raised by actions for personal injuries
caused by toxic substances and focus on the treatment of those
issues in state and federal courts in the United States Fourth Cir-
cuit. The final area of discussion in this article concerns insurance
coverage for producers of toxic substances.
II. STATUTES OF LIMITATION AND STATUTES OF REPOSE
There is a broad range of statutes of limitation and statutes of
repose 8 that may be applicable in a toxic substances case depend-
ing on the theory of liability, the damages sought, and the subject
matter under dispute. Written contract and unwritten contract, 9
Uniform Commercial Code sales,40 trespass, 41 fraud,42 and various
statutory 3 causes of action have limitations periods that vary from
2 to 6 years. Statutes of limitation for damage to personal prop-
35. See text accompanying notes 315-21 infra.
36. See text accompanying notes 307-10 infra.
37. See text accompanying notes 328-35 infra.
38. See generally Birnbaum, The Discovery Rule Approach: Statutes of Limitations in
Environmental Suits, 16 TRIAL 38 (1980); Massery, Date-of-Sale Statutes of Limitation -
A New Immunity for Products Suppliers, 1977 INs. L. J. 535; McGovern, The Status of
Statutes of Limitations and Statutes of Repose in Product Liability Actions: Present and
Future, 16 FORUM 416 (1981); Peters, Occupational Carcinogenesis and Statutes of Limita-
tion: Resolving Relevent Policy Goals, 10 ENVT'L L. 113 (1979-80); Zepkin, Virginia's Con-
tinuing Negligent Treatment Rule: Farley v. Goode and Fenton v. Danaceau, 15 U. RICH.
L. REv. 231 (1981); Note, Accrual Dilemma: Statutes of Limitations in Hazardous Waste
Cases, 45 ALB. L. Rnv. 717 (1981); Note, Wrongful Death and Limitation of Actions: The
Interaction Between North Carolina's Wrongful Death Statute and its Statute of Limita-
tions for Not Readily Apparent Personal Injuries or Product Defects, 13 WAKE FoREsT L.
REv. 543 (1977).
39. See MD. CTS. & Jut. PROC. CODE ANN. § 5-101 (Rep]. Vol. 1980); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-
52(1) (Repl. 1969 & Cum. Supp. 1981); S.C. CODE § 15-3-530(1) (1976); VA. CODE ANN. §
8.01-246 (Repl. Vol. 1977); W. VA. CODE § 55-2-6 (Repl. Vol. 1981).
40. See MD. CoM. LAW CODE ANN. § 2-725 (1975); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-2-725 (Repl. 1965
& Curn. Supp. 1981); S.C. CODE § 36-2-725 (1976); VA. CODE: ANN. § 8.2-725 (Repl. Vol.
1965); W. VA. CODE § 46-2-725 (1966).
41. See MD. CTs. & Jun. PROC. CODE ANN. § 5-101 (Repl. Vol. 1980); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-
52(3) (Repl. 1969 & Cum. Supp. 1981); S.C. CODE § 15-3-530(3) (1976); VA. CODE ANN. §
8.01-243(B) (Repl. Vol. 1977); W. VA. CODE § 55-2-12 (Repl. Vol. 1981).
42. See MD. CTs. & Jun. PROC. CODE ANN. § 5-101 (Repl. Vol. 1980); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-
52(9) (Repl. 1969 & Cum. Supp. 1981); S.C. CODE § 15-3-530(7) (1976).
43. See Mn. CTS. & JuD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 5-101 (Repl. Vol. 1980); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-
52(2) (RepL 1969 & Cum. Supp. 1981); S.C. CODE § 15-3-530(2) (1976); VA. CODE ANN. §
8.01-243 (Repl. Vol. 1977).
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erty,"4 personal injury 5 and wrongful death4 also range from 2 to
6 years. Medical malpractice, 47 architects' and contractors', 8 prod-
uct liability49 and general50 statutes of limitation and repose have
time periods that vary from 3 to 12 years. In some situations laches
may apply. 1
There has been and will continue to be substantial debate con-
cerning the applicable statute in any given case. In the asbestosis
cases involving ship workers, plaintiffs have attempted to apply
admiralty law rather than state common law because of the out-
come determinative effect of some state statutes of limitation and
repose.5 In cases where the tort statute of limitations bars recov-
ery, actions for damages to person or property have been filed
under warranty or fraud.53
The most frequently litigated issue in this area has involved the
interpretation of the commencement time for tort statutes of limi-
tations." Most tort statutes of limitation begin to run at the ac-
crual of a cause of action. "Accrual" has been defined to mean:
when a duty is breached; when a person is first injured; when a
44. See Mi. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 5-101 (Repl. Vol. 1980); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-
52(4) (Repl. 1969 & Cum. Supp. 1981); S.C. CODE § 15-3-530(4) (1976); VA. CODE ANN.. §
8.01-243(B) (Repl. Vol. 1977); W. VA. CODE § 55-2-12 (Repl. Vol. 1981).
45. See MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 5-101 (Repl. Vol. 1980); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-
52(16) (Repl. 1969 & Cum. Supp. 1981); S.C. CODE § 15-3-530(5) (1976 & Cum. Supp. 1981);
VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-243(A) (Repl. Vol. 1977); W. VA. CODE § 55-2-12 (Repl. Vol. 1981).
46. See MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-904(f) (Repl. Vol. 1980); N.C. GEN. STAT. §
1-53(4) (Repl. 1969 & Cum. Supp. 1981); S.C. CODE § 15-3-530(6) (1976); VA. CODE ANN. §
8.01-244 (Repl. Vol. 1977); W. VA. CODE § 55-7-6 (Repl. Vol. 1981).
47. See MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 5-109 (Repl. Vol. 1980); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-
15(c) (Cum. Supp. 1981); S.C. CODE § 15-3-545 (Cum. Supp. 1980).
48. See MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 5-108 (Repl. Vol. 1980); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-
50(5) (Repl. 1969 & Cum. Supp. 1981); S.C. CODE § 15-3-640 (1976); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-
250 (Repl. Vol. 1977).
49. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-50(6) (Repl. 1969 & Supp. 1981).
50. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-56 (Repl. 1969).
51. A situation where laches may apply is an admiralty-based action. See White v. Johns-
Manville Corp., 662 F.2d 234 (4th Cir. 1981).
52. Id.
53. See, e.g., Branden v. Gerbie, 62 Ill. App. 3d 138, 379 N.E.2d 7 (1978)(plaintiff did not
discover the identity of IUD manufacturer until after the running of the personal injury
statute of limitation but before the expiration of the U.C.C. warranty period). Similar
problems occur in workmen's compensation cases where the time for filing claims has past.
See Burdette v. Burlington Indus., Inc., No. 79-2116-7 (D.S.C. July 10, 1981); Wilkins v.
West Point-Pepperell, Inc., 397 So. 2d 115 (Ala. 1981); Copeland v. Johns-Manville Prods.
Corp., 492 F. Supp. 498 (D.N.J. 1980); McDaniel v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 487 F.
Supp. 714 (D. IM. 1978).
54. See, e.g., Locke v. Johns-Manville Corp., 221 Va. 951, 275 S.E.2d 900 (1981).
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person is last injured; when a person is, or should be, aware of an
injury; when a person is, or should be, aware of the full extent of
injury, when a person is aware of the cause of injury; when a per-
son is aware of the defendant's conduct; when a person is aware of
a causal connection between an injury and a defendant; when a
person is aware of facts that give rise to a lawsuit; and when a
person is aware that there is a lawsuit.5 Even when the accrual of
a cause of action has been judicially or statutorily defined, there
has been debate concerning the applicability of that accrual time
to a specific theory of liability. Some plaintiffs have had success,
for example, in circumventing statute of limitation bars by assert-
ing "continuing" and "secondary exposure" theories such as con-
tinuing duty to warn, continuing exposure, continuing negligence,
and imputation of a continuing relationship.5
There has been some confusion concerning the respective defini-
tions of statute of limitation and statute of repose. Although these
55. McGovern, supra note 38. In Maryland, as a general rule, a cause of action accrues at
the time of injury and not upon its discovery. Allentown Plaza v. Suburban Propane Gas
Corp., 43 Md. App. 337, 405 A.2d 326 (1979). Exceptions have been made where a profes-
sional relationship exists and the injury is not readily apparent. Steelworkers Holding Co. v.
Menefee, 255 Md. App. 440, 258 A.2d 177 (1972)(construction malpractice); Waldman v.
Rohrbaugh, 241 Md. 137, 215 A.2d 825 (1966)(medical malpractice); Hahn v. Claybrook, 130
Md. 179, 100 A. 83 (1917) (medical malpractice). The discovery rule exception has been used
in a latent disease case. See Harig v. Johns-Manville Prods. Corp., 284 Md. App. 70, 394
A.2d 299 (1978).
In North Carolina, accrual of a cause of action does not occur "until bodily harm to the
claimant or physical damage to his property becomes apparent or ought reasonably to have
become apparent to claimant." There is a 10-year repose limitation. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-
52(16) (Curn. Supp. 1981). In South Carolina, actions for injury to the person or rights of
another, not arising from contract must be "commenced within six years after the person
knew or by the exercise of reasonable diligence should have known that he had a cause of
action." S.C. CODE § 15-3-535 (Cur. Supp. 1981).
Virginia utilizes the "continuing treatment" theory. See Fenton v. Danaceau, 220 Va. 1,
255 S.E.2d 349 (1979) (doctor); Farley v. Goode, 219 Va. 969, 252 S.E.2d 594 (1979) (lawyer);
Comptroller of Va. Military Inst. v. King, 217 Va. 751, 232 S.E.2d 895 (1977) (architect).
However, negligence counts in products liability actions are triggered by the occurrence of
the personal injury. See Caudill v. Wise Rambler, Inc., 210 Va. 11, 168 S.E.2d 257 (1969).
But see Locke v. Johns-Manville Corp., 221 Va. 951, 275 S.E.2d 900 (1981) (asbestos worker
allowed recovery from defendant manufacturer after statute of limitations had run from the
time of plaintiff's last exposure to the product because plaintiff's disease was not medically
discoverable at that time and, therefore, he had not been injured).
Relying on the rationale of earlier trespass cases involving subterranean coal mining, West
Virginia adopted the discovery rule in situations where a foreign object was negligently left
in a patient following surgery. See Morgan v. Grace Hospital, Inc., 149 W. Va. 783, 144
S.E.2d 156 (1965). The discovery rule exception is no longer limited to fraudulent conceal-
ment type situations. See Harrison v. Seltzer, 268 S.E.2d 312 (W. Va. 1980) (improper
diagnosis).
56. See Virginia cases cited in note 55 supra.
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
terms have been used in a number of different ways," a statute of
limitation refers to the time between the accrual of a cause of ac-
tion and the last date available for filing a lawsuit. In states that
allow a plaintiff to file suit at the discovery of an injury rather
than when the injury occurs, suit can potentially be filed a sub-
stantial number of years after an injury actually happens. Some
state legislatures have put an outer limit or cap on the time availa-
ble for a plaintiff to discover an injury and file suit. This outer
limit typically begins to run from the time of actual injury.58 In
North Carolina, 59 for example, an injured person must bring an ac-
tion for personal injury against a physician within three years of
the time of the injury unless the injured party has not had an op-
portunity to discover the injury. In no event, however, can the in-
jured party bring suit more than ten years from the occurrence of
actual injury. This limit of ten years is called a statute of repose. °
More appropriately, however, a statute of repose refers to a time
limit for bringing a lawsuit that begins to run, not from the accrual
of a cause of action, but from some other event such as the manu-
facture of a product. 1 In Virginia, for example, actions for per-
sonal injury against architects and contractors in connection with
the design or construction of a building must be brought within
five years after the performance or furnishing of such services and
construction.62
The differences between these two definitions of statute of re-
pose can become crucial when issues of constitutionality and con-
flict of laws are raised. Statutes of repose have been attacked
under federal and state constitutional provisions including equal
protection, special legislation, privileges and immunities, uniform-
ity, equality, due process, vagueness, open court, remedy, title and
subject and impairment of contract .6 The outcome of these chal-
lenges typically varies in accordance with the type of definition a
court gives the statute. State supreme courts have had a variety of
57. See McGovern, The Variety, Policy and Constitutionality of Product Liability Stat-
utes of Repose, 30 AM. U.L. REv. 579, 582 (1981).
58. Id. at 583.
59. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-15(c)(Cum. Supp. 1981).
60. Id.
61. For example, in South Dakota, product liability actions must be brought within six
years of delivery to first user. S.D. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 15-2-12.1 (Supp. 1981).
62. VA. CODE: ANN. § 8.01-250 (Repl. Vol. 1977).
63. McGovern, supra note 57, at 600.
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results: South Carolina" declared its architects' and contractors'
statutes unconstitutional, whereas a similar Virginia6 5 statute ap-
pears to be constitutional. The definition of statute of repose may
also affect interpretations of whether they are purely procedural or
substantive in nature for purposes of selecting the appropriate law
when there is a conflict between jurisdictions.
Probably the most fruitful areas of future litigation concerning
statutes of limitation and statutes of repose will involve a host of
ingenious attempts by plaintiffs' attorneys to circumvent these
statutory bars. Efforts will be made to find more favorable forums,
either federal or state."' More attention will be devoted to both
statutory and common law provisions such as incapacity, 7 fraudu-
lent concealment 8 or estoppe 69 to toll these statutes. Plaintiffs
will seek to narrow the applicability of statutory bars by urging
definitions of terms that allow more flexibility.70 New defendants7 1
and new concepts of plaintiffs72 and damages73 will arise.
64. See Broome v. Truluck, 270 S.C. 227, 241 S.E.2d 739 (1978).
65. See Smith v. Allen-Bradley Co., 371 F. Supp. 698 (W.D. Va. 1974); Comptroller of Va.
Military Inst. v. King, 217 Va. 751, 232 S.E.2d 895 (1977). See also Flippin v. Jarrell, 301
N.C. 108, 270 S.E.2d 482 (1980); Bolick v. American Barmag Corp., - N.C. App. -, 284
S.E.2d 188 (1981).
66. As an example, in Thomas v. Johns-Manville Corp., C.P. No. 77-1 (E.D. Va. Jan. 18,
1980)(order confirming settlement), the defendant settled the claim against it because the
plaintiff could have filed a similar suit in Florida and avoided the possibility of being barred
by Virginia's statute of limitation. See also Harrison v. Piedmont Aviation, Inc., 432 F.
Supp. 980 (S.D. W. Va. 1977); Gattis v. Chavez, 413 F. Supp. 33 (D.S.C. 1976); Davis v. E.I.
DuPont De Nemours & Co., 400 F. Supp. 1347 (W.D.N.C. 1974); Doughty v. Prettyman, 219
Md. 83, 148 A.2d 438 (1959); Sherley v. Lotz, 200 Va. 173, 104 S.E.2d 795 (1958); Tice v. E.I.
DuPont De Nemours & Co., 144 W. Va. 24, 106 S.E.2d 107 (1958).
67. See generally Lane v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 48 N.C. App. 634, 269 S.E.2d 711 (1980);
Hohn v. Slate, 48 N.C. App. 624, 269 S.E.2d 307 (1980).
68. See generally Altman v. Williams Furniture Co., 250 S.C. 98, 156 S.E.2d 433 (1967);
Contee Sand & Gravel Co. v. Reliance Ins. Co., 209 Va. 672, 166 S.E.2d 290 (1969); Harrison
v. Seltzer, 268 S.E.2d 312 (W. Va. 1980).
69. See Beverage v. Harvey, 602 F.2d 657 (4th Cir. 1979); Johns Hopkins Hospital v.
Tehninger, 48 Md. App. 549, 429 A.2d 538 (1981); Troy's Stereo Center, Inc. v. Hodson, 39
N.C. App. 591, 251 S.E.2d 673 (1979); Carl Rose & Sons Ready Mix Concrete, Inc. v. Thorp
Sales Corp., 36 N.C. App. 778, 245 S.E.2d 234 (1978); Robertson v. Brissey's Garage, Inc.,
270 S.C. 58, 240 S.E.2d 810 (1978); Boykins Narrow Fabrics Corp. v. Weldon Rfg. & Sheet
Metal, Inc., 221 Va. 81, 266 S.E.2d 887 (1980); Humble Oil & Refining Co. v. Lane, 152 W.
Va. 578, 165 S.E.2d 379 (1969).
70. For example, plaintiffs could urge use of a more favorable "accrual" date or of one of
the "discovery" exceptions, see note 55 supra, and when appropriate, challenge the retroac-
tive application of a newly enacted statute. See Flippin v. Jarrell, 301 N.C. 108, 270 S.E.2d
482 (1980).
71. See text accompanying notes 116 & 120 infra.
72. A child may be injured by acts committed before conception, Renslow v. Mennonite
Hospital, 67 ll. 2d 348, 367 N.E.2d 1250 (1977)(blood transfusion given mother several
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One major ramification of attempts to have the judiciary circum-
vent the rigid bars to recovery for plaintiffs established by the leg-
islature will be a more overt conflict between courts and legisla-
tures in determining liability for personal injuries. 4 Heretofore,
legislatures have given the judiciary wide discretion in establishing
rules of liability at common law. More recently, there has been a
trend on the part of legislatures to overrule common law rules, at
least in the area of product liability."8 If courts continue to expand
liability and circumvent legislative dictates, the potential for fur-
ther legislative intervention is enhanced. 6
III. COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL
Plaintiffs' attorneys have suggested that the offensive use of col-
lateral estoppel" is appropriate in toxic substances cases. Under
this theory a defendant who loses one or more cases involving the
issue of the defectiveness of a particular toxic substance would be
precluded from denying the defectiveness of an identical product
in subsequent litigation by different plaintiffs.7 Plaintiffs argue
that offensive collateral estoppel would promote judicial economy 9
years before birth), or during the pregnancy, Phillips v. United States, 508 F. Supp. 537
(D.S.C. 1980)(failure to provide adequate genetic counselling to parents).
73. See, e.g., Hinkie v. United States, 524 F. Supp. 277 (E.D. Pa. 1981)(allegation of chro-
mosomal damage by participant in nuclear blast test); Burdette v. Burlington Indus., Inc.,
No. 79-2116-7 (D.S.C. July 10, 1981)(damages for fraudulently concealing availability of
workmen's compensation benefits).
74. See McGovern, supra note 57, at 595.
75. Buchanan, Product Liability Defenses Under the Model Uniform Product Liability
Act and State Legislation, 15 FORUM 813 (1980).
76. Sherman, Legislative Responses to Judicial Activism in Strict Liability: Reform or
Reaction?, 44 BROoKLYN L. REV. 359 (1978); Twerski, Rebuilding the Citadel: The Legisla-
tive Assault on the Common Law, 15 TRaAL 55 (1979).
77. See generally Callen & Kadue, To Bury Mutuality, Not to Praise It: An Analysis of
Collateral Estoppel After Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 31 HASTNG L.J. 755 (1980);
Deahl, Offensive Collateral Estoppel Under the Full and Fair Opportunity Test, 15 LAND
& WATER L. REV. 247 (1980); George, Sweet Uses of Adversity: Parklane Hosiery and the
Collateral Class Action, 32 STAN. L. REV. 655 (1980); Kroll, Principles of Collateral Estop-
pel in Products Liability, 1979 INs. L.J. 313; Stewart, Res Judicata and Collateral Estoppel
in South Carolina, 28 S.C. L. Rev. 451 (1977); Weinberger, Collateral Estoppel and the
Mass Produced Product: A Proposal, 15 NEw ENGLAND L. REV. 1 (1979).
78. See Hardy v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 509 F. Supp. 1353 (E.D. Tex. 1981), appeal
docketed, No. 81-2204 (5th Cir. May 26, 1981); Migues v. Nicolet Indus., Inc., 493 F. Supp.
61 (E.D. Tex. 1980), rev'd in part and remanded, 662 F.2d 1182 (5th Cir. 1981); Flatt v.
Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 488 F. Supp. 836 (E.D. Tex. 1980); Mooney v. Fibreboard
Corp., 485 F. Supp. 242 (E.D. Tex. 1980). But see McCarty v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp.,
502 F. Supp. 335 (S.D. Miss. 1980); Tretter v. Johns-Manville Corp., 88 F.R.D. 329 (E.D.
Mo. 1980).
79. See Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322 (1979).
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and uniform decisionmakings and would prevent defendants with
unlimited assets from relitigating the same issues to the detriment
of less solvent plaintiffs."' Even when a manufacturer is estopped
from relitigating certain issues, a plaintiff retains the burden of
proof as to many key issues.8 2 While possibly simplifying the trial,
victory is in no way assured. 3 Also, the use of collateral estoppel
could effect the manner or style in which a trial is conducted. The
defense bar has countered that mutuality of the parties is a prereq-
uisite to the use of offensive collateral estoppel, that the standards
for the application of offensive collateral estoppel are not met in
these specific fact situations, and that state rules on collateral es-
toppel should be used in federal diversity actions. Issue preclusion
has also been justified on alternative grounds of stare decisis and
judicial notice.84 Defense lawyers contend that -use of these con-
cepts is questionable because the factual situations vary greatly
from case to case.8 5
Most states have traditionally required that identical plaintiffs
and defendants must have litigated an issue before one of the same
plaintiffs can prevent one of the same defendants from re-litigating
the same issue.' The United States Supreme Court,8 7 the Restate-
80. See Baldwin, Asbestos Litigation and Collateral Estoppel 8 (Aug. 11, 1981)(paper
presented at ABA Annual Meeting, New Orleans, La.).
81. See Vincent v. Thompson, 79 Misc. 2d 1029, -, 361 N.Y.S.2d 282, 289 (1974), re-
versed, 50 A.D. 2d 211, 377 N.Y.S.2d 118 (1975). See also Weinberger, supra note 77, at 20-
21.
82. In the Texas asbestos cases, although the manufacturers were estopped from relitigat-
ing whether products containing asbestos were defective and whether a4bestos dust could
cause mesothelioma, plaintiffs still had to establish exposure to asbestos sufficient enough to
cause a disease. See Flatt v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 488 F. Supp. 836, 840 (E.D. Tex.
1980); Mooney v. Fibreboard Corp., 485 F. Supp. 242 (E.D. Tex. 1980).
83. See, e.g., Mooney v. Fibreboard Corp., 485 F. Supp. 242 (E.D. Tex. 1980). See also
Grant v. Parke, Davis & Co., 544 F.2d 521 (7th Cir. 1976)(unpublished, reported in [1977]
PROD. LiAB. REP. (CCH) 7848 ("[P]laintiffs were lulled 'into a false sense of security' by
their reliance on the doctrine of collateral estoppel .... ")(quoting Vincent v. Thompson,
50 A.D.2d 211, -, 377 N.Y.S.2d 118, 131 (1975)).
84. See, e.g., Flatt v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 488 F. Supp. 836, 841 (E.D. Tex.
1980)("as a matter of law.., asbestos dust is a competent producing cause of certain lung
diseases, including asbestosis and mesothelioma"). See also Mooney v. Fibreboard Corp.,
485 F. Supp. 242 (E.D. Tex. 1980)(stare decisis). But in Migues v. Nicolet Indus., Inc., 662
F.2d 1182, 1187-89 (5th Cir. 1981), such a use of stare decisis was disapproved.
85. Brief for Appellant Owens-Illinois, Inc., at 28-34, Hardy v. Johns-Manville Sales
Corp., 509 F. Supp. 1353 (E.D. Tex. 1981).
86. See National Mortgage Corp. v. American Title Ins. Co., 299 N.C. 369, 261 S.E.2d 844
(1980); Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. v. Bailey Lumber Co., 221 Va. 638, 272 S.E.2d 217 (1980).
87. Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322 (1979); Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v.
University of Illinois Foundation, 402 U.S. 313 (1971).
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ment of Judgments, 8 and a minority of state courts,89 however,
have abandoned this requirement of mutality in certain types of
cases.90 Some courts have carried the demise of mutuality even fur-
ther by allowing the offensive use of collateral estoppel against
parties in privity with a party in a prior adjudication.9 1 Other
courts have held that any party who sold an identical product pre-
viously determined to be defective would also be estopped from
asserting that the product was not defective in subsequent
litigation.9 2
Defendant manufacturers have relied upon arguments of due
process and right to trial by jury to retain the requirement of mu-
tuality.93 Commentators have argued that the common law judi-
cial system should promote individualized justice94 and should not
interfere with an individual's allocation of his resources.95 These
critics of the elimination of the mutuality rule note that there is no
evidence that preempting future litigation on specific issues cuts
down on litigation time; in fact, more effort may be expended in
trying otherwise trivial cases or in arguing the appropriateness of
the application of collateral estoppel in a particular situation.96
More importantly they suggest that concepts of fairness embodied
in due process guarantees and common sense dictate that one loss
by a defendant in an overall litigation potentially involving hun-
dreds of plaintiffs should not preclude additional trials on the mer-
88. Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 88 (Tent. Draft No. 3, 1976).
89. See, e.g., Bernhard v. Bank of America, 19 Cal. 2d 807, 811-13, 122 P.2d 892, 894-95
(1942); MPC, Inc. v. Kenny, 279 Md. 29, -, 367 A.2d 486, 489-90 (1977).
90. Such cases include actions for patent infringements, recovery of unpaid income taxes,
and disputes over the ownership of or the right to land or monies.
91. See Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322 (1979); Flatt v. Johns-Manville Sales
Corp., 488 F. Supp. 836 (E.D. Tex. 1980); Mooney v. Fibreboard Corp., 485 F. Supp. 242
(E.D. Tex. 1980).
92. See Hardy v. Johns-Manville, 509 F. Supp. 1353 (E.D. Tex. 1981); Migues v. Nicolet
Indus., Inc., 493 F. Supp. 61 (E.D. Tex. 1980), rev'd in part and remanded, 662 F.2d 1182
(5th Cir. 1981).
93. See Brief for Appellant, Migues v. Nicolet Indus., Inc., 493 F. Supp. 61 (E.D. Tex.
1980); Brief for Appellant, Hardy v. Johns-Manville, 509 F. Supp. 1353 (E.D. Tex. 1981).
94. See Note, Invoking Collateral Estoppel Offensively: The Ends of Justice or the End
of Justice, 4 AM. J. TRIAL ADvOCAcY 75, 88 (1980).
95. "Likewise, the losing party who is estopped by the nonparty requires no protection
because relitigation would mean a benefit, not a burden. Despite additional expense, the
losing party may prefer to reopen the litigation with the hope of receiving a different judg-
ment." Note, Nonmutuality: Taking the Fairness out of Collateral Estoppel, 13 IND. L.
REv. 563, 571 (1980).
96. Id. at 572-75.
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its. 7 Most of the states in the Fourth Circuit have been persuaded
by these counterarguments. 9
Even if a court decides to eliminate the requirement of mutual-
ity, the appropriateness of the use of offensive collateral estoppel
in any specific fact situation involves substantial additional analy-
sis by both the parties and the court. There is a broad range of
inquiries to insure that a defendant has had a "full" and "fair"
opportunity to litigate an issue.9  Courts have examined in detail
whether an issue was fully litigated, whether it was necessary and
essential to a previous judgment, and whether it was identical to
the pending issue.100 A court may also examine the entire legal cli-
mate to insure that there have been no changes in related substan-
tive or procedural law. 011 Other factors for consideration may re-
late to the case as a whole: the size of the claim, the forum of prior
litigation, the incentive to litigate, the extent of the litigation, the
competence and experience of counsel, the availability of new evi-
dence, indications of a compromise verdict, the feasibility of future
litigation and potentially inconsistent verdicts.0 2 The standard is
one of fairness, to be determined on a case-by-case method.10 3
Once a court decides that there is appropriate identity of issues, it
may shift the burden to the defendant to show that there was not
a full and fair opportunity to litigate in the earlier trial or that
issue preclusion would be unjust.104 Appellate courts will grant
97. Opponents of collateral estoppel point to Professor Currie's example of a train wreck
with fifty injured passengers. The defendant prevailed in the initial twenty-five trials before
losing the twenty-sixth. Should the remaining passengers benefit from this single adverse
verdict? Currie, Mutuality of Estoppel: Limits of the Bernhard Doctrine, 9 STAN. L. REV.
281 (1957).
98. See note 86 supra. Also, the requirement of mutuality has not been abandoned in
South Carolina. Stewart, Res Judicata and Collateral Estoppel in South Carolina, 28 S.C.
L. REV. 451, 475-78 (1977).
99. See Technograph Printed Circuits, Ltd. v. Martin-Marietta Corp., 474 F.2d 798 (4th
Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 880 (1973); Moore v. Allied Chem. Corp., 480 F. Supp. 377
(E.D. Va. 1979).
100. See Hughes v. Heyl & Patterson, 647 F.2d 452 (4th Cir. 1981); J. Aron & Co. v.
Service Transp. Co., 515 F. Supp. 428 (D. Md. 1981); Citizens Comm. to Oppose Annexation
v. City of Lynchburg, 400 F. Supp. 68 (W.D. Va.), afl'd in part & vacated in part, 528 F.2d
816 (4th Cir. 1975); Lawson v. Baltimore Paint & Chem. Corp., 347 F. Supp. 967 (D. Md.
1972).
101. See Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147 (1979); Commissioner of Internal Reve-
nue v. Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591 (1948); Silver Brand Clothes, Inc. v. United States, 544 F.2d
749 (4th Cir. 1976).
102. These factors were set out in Schwartz v. Public Admin. of County of Bronx, 24 N.Y.
2d 65, 246 N.E.2d 725, 298 N.Y.S.2d 955 (1969).
103. United States v. United Air Lines, Inc., 216 F. Supp. 709, 726 (E.D. Wash. 1962).
104. See State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Century Home Co., 275 Or. 97, -, 550 P.2d
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trial courts broad discretion to determine the application of offen-
sive collateral estoppel in any given case. 105
The final major issue in this area concerns the application of
federal or state rules concerning the offensive use of collateral es-
toppel in federal diversity actions.10 6 If there is a favorable verdict
plaintiffs' attorneys typically argue that collateral estoppel is pro-
cedural and thus, federal law should apply. Similarly, they argue
that there are strong federal policies for maintaining the integrity
of federal court judgments such as, encouraging judicial economy
and eliminating multiplicious litigation, at least as far as the appli-
cability of offensive collateral estoppel to previous federal court de-
cisions.107  Defendants argue that collateral estoppel involves sub-
stantive law and, even if it is not substantive, it is outcome-
determinative and thus the appropriate state law of collateral es-
toppel should apply.108 They further suggest that the federal law of
collateral estoppel should not apply when a previous federal deci-
sion is based upon diversity jurisdiction and not upon a federal
question.109 Otherwise, plaintiffs might be inclined to forum shop
with an inevitable inequity in the administration of laws. °10 Most
1185, 1189 (1976). "
105. Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. at 331.
106. For a discussion of this issue, see the asbestos cases from the Federal District Court
for the Eastern District of Texas cited in supra note 78. Texas state courts have consistently
required mutuality. See also Hammonds v. Holmes, 559 S.W.2d 345 (Tex. 1977).
107. See Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Co-op., Inc., 356 U.S. 525 (1958); J. Aron & Co.
v. Service Transp. Co., 515 F. Supp. 428 (D. Md. 1981).
108. See Guaranty Trust Co. v. Tompkins, 326 U.S. 99 (1945). See also Brief for Appel-
lant, Migues v. Nicolet Indus., Inc., 493 F. Supp. 61 (E.D. Tex. 1980), rev'd in part & re-
manded, 662 F.2d 1182 (5th Cir. 1981); Brief for Appellant, Hardy v. Johns-Manville, 509 F.
Supp. 1353 (E.D. Tex. 1981).
109. See Aerojet-General Corp. v. Askew, 511 F.2d 710 (5th Cir.), appeal dismissed sub
nom. Metropolitan Dade County v. Aerojet-General Corp., 423 U.S. 908, reh. denied, 423
U.S. 1026 (1975).
110. In Hardy v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., one of the appellant manufacturers con-
tended that:
The lower court's collateral estoppel ruling has also resulted in geographical forum
shopping. An example of this is James S. Drake v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., No.
M-78-112-CA (E.D. Tex., Marshall Div.), in which there are thirty-two plaintiffs. All
worked at the DuPont plant in Old Hickory, Tennessee. None of the plaintiffs ever
lived in Texas or worked in Texas. When they decided to file an asbestos lawsuit,
however they came to Marshall, Texas.
Brief for Appellant Owens-Illinois, Inc., at 44, Hardy v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 509 F.
Supp. 1353 (E.D. Tex. 1981). At the time these cases were brought asbestos manufacturers
had prevailed in a series of cases tried in Tennessee. See Starnes v. Johns-Manville Corp.,
No. 2-75-122 (E.D. Tenn. Feb. 17, 1977); Campbell v. Johns-Manville Corp., No. 2-78-185
(E.D. Tenn. Dec. 1978); Daniels v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., No. 1-492-75 (Circuit Court,
Knox County, Tenn. Nov. 8, 1977).
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federal circuit and district courts apply state rules concerning the
offensive use of collateral estoppel to diversity actions.111
IV. IDENTIFICATION OF PARTIES
The scope of this article is restricted to physical harm to persons
or property caused by toxic substances and thus the potential
plaintiffs in these cases have suffered some type of physical
harm.1 2 If an individual is barred from recovery for an injury be-
cause of a common law or statutory restriction, he may bring a
derivative suit or may sue in a different capacity based upon his
familial or other relationship to another injured person."'1 A plain-
tiff's physical harm may be medically unascertainable and so suit
may be brought for damages other than personal injury.11 4 Expo-
sure to some toxic substances, for example, does not leave any im-
mediate diagnosable harm but may generate substantial concern
'about the possibility of future untoward effects.' 5
The range of defendants is enormous. Suits involving a definable
product may include manufacturers, suppliers, wholesalers, com-
111. St. Paul Fire & Marine Inc. Co. v. Lock, 476 F.2d 583 (4th Cir. 1973); Graves v.
Associated Transp., Inc., 344 F.2d 894 (4th Cir. 1965); Alderman v. Chrysler Corp., 480 F.
Supp. 600 (E.D. Va. 1979); Travelers Corp. v. Boyer, 301 F. Supp. 1396 (D. Md. 1969).
112. See generally Butler, The Worker, A Defective Product, An Injury: Who Pays and
Why, A Solution for Ohio, 50 U. CIN. L. REv. 31 (1981); Henderson, Products Liability:
DES Litigation: The Tidal Wave Approaches Shore, 3 CoRP. L. REv. 143 (1980); Kroll,
Intra-Industry Joint Liability: The Era of Absolute Products Liability, 1980 INS. L. J. 185
(1980); Note, Industry-Wide Liability: Solving the Mystery of the Missing Manufacturer in
Products Liability Law, 38 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 139 (1981); Comment, Beyond Enterprise
Liability in DES Cases: Sindell, 14 IND. L. REv. 695 (1981); Comment, Market Share Lia-
bility Adopted to Overcome Defendant Identification Requirement in DES Litigation, 59
WASH. U. L. Q. 571 (1981).
113. For example, in Spruill v. Boyle-Midway, Inc., 308 F.2d 79 (4th Cir. 1962), a mother,
who may have been contributorily negligent in leaving a toxic furniture polish within reach
of her infant, recovered in a wrongful death action against the manufacturer. Compare Phil-
lips v. United States, 508 F. Supp. 537 (D.S.C. 1980)(rejection of child's action for damages
on theory of wrongful life due to doctor's failure to give mother genetic counselling) with
Phillips v. United States, 508 F. Supp. 544 (D.S.C. 1980) (parents' action for wrongful birth
due to doctor's failure to give genetic counselling recognized as a valid cause of action).
114. See Marrapese v. Rhode Island, 500 F. Supp. 1207 (D.R.I. 1980) (suit brought under
42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging violation of criminal suspects civil rights when a known carcinogen
was applied to his hands as part of a chemical test for traces of blood). See also text accom-
panying notes 331 and 332 infra (actions for mental anguish) and text accompanying note
328 infra (allegations of putting persons "at risk").
115. See, e.g., Hinkie v. United States, 524 F. Supp. 277 (E.D. Pa. 1981) (genetic or chro-
mosomal damage); Langdon & Alpha Business Servs., Inc. v. Hunt, No. 80-487-CIV-5
(E.D.N.C. 1980) (potential harmful effects from an illegal roadside dumping of chemicals);
Village of Wilsonville v. SCA Servs., Inc., 77 Ill. App. 3d 618, 396 N.E.2d 552 (1979), afl'd,
86 Ill. 2d 1, 426 N.E.2d 824 (1981) (future escape of toxic wastes from a disposal site).
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mercial carriers, packagers, advertisers, endorsers, franchisers and
franchisees, fabricaters, storers, retailers and others.1 ' Exposure
to industrial toxic substances may impose liability upon an entire
industry, an area of industry, architects, contractors, maintainers,
owners of land and an endless variety of providers of services.11
Employees exposed to toxic substances may bring suit against in-
surance, union, plant, government and private inspectors, co-em-
ployees, product suppliers and manufacturers, contractors, archi-
tects, and employers."1 8 Health care providers such as doctors,
hospitals, clinics, nurses and pharmacists are also potentially lia-
ble." 9 Federal, state and local governments and government em-
ployees may not be immune from suit. 20
Once defendants are sued, they typically seek contribution or in-
demnity from an equally large variety of parties.' 2' Federal, state
and local governments, entire industries, and other producers of an
allegedly defective product may be joined.'22 For example, manu-
facturers and sellers of asbestos who have been sued by individual
plaintiffs for causing asbestosis have filed third party actions
against both the United States Government and the entire tobacco
industry. 23
116. Davis v. Silco, 47 N.C. App. 237, 267 S.E.2d 354, review denied, 301 N.C. 234, 283
S.E.2d 131 (1980). See also N.C. GEN. STAT. § 99B-1 (Repl. Vol. 1979) (listing of possible
defendants in a products liability action).
117. See Ryan v. Eli Lilly & Co., 514 F. Supp. 1004 (D.S.C. 1981); Sindell v. Abbott Labs.,
26 Cal. 3d 588, 607 P.2d 924, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132 (attempts to make all pharmaceutical firms
which produced DES liable for injuries caused by its use), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 285
(1980); Davis v. Henderlong Lumber Co., 221 F. Supp. 129 (N.D. Ind. 1963) (contractor not
liable for plaintiff's injury resulting from inhalation of toxic fumes due to contractor's instal-
lation of laboratory exhaust fan when he had no knowledge of faulty plans for installation).
See also 58 AM. JUR. 2d Nuisance § 49 (1971) (property owners liability for creating or
continuing a nuisance).
118. Burdette v. Burlington Indus. Inc., No. 79-2116-7 (D.S.C. July 10, 1981). See also
text accompanying note 264 infra.
119. Werner v. Upjohn Co., 628 F.2d 848 (4th Cir. 1980) (opthalmologist), cert. denied,
101 S. Ct. 862 (1981); Bastiste v. American Home Prods., 32 N.C. App. 1, 231 S.E.2d 269
(1977) (doctor and druggist held not liable).
120. See Burchfield v. Regents of Univ. of Colorado, 516 F. Supp. 1301 (D. Colo. 1981)
(physicians not protected by doctrine of official immunity in suit alleging mistreatment of
Rocky Mountain Arsenal employees exposed to toxic substances on the job). See also Best
v. United States, 505 F. Supp. 48 (E.D.N.C. 1980).
121. See Eaton Corp. v. Wright, 281 Md. 80, 375 A.2d 1122 (1977).
122. See Maas v. Ottawa Stockdale Fertilizer, Inc., 9 Ill. App. 3d 33, 291 N.E.2d 514
(1972).
123. See Keene Corp. v. United States, No. 80-CIV-401 (GLG) (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 1981)
(reprinted in [1981] 2 PROD. LIAB. REP. (CCH) V 9083); Oman v. Johns-Manville Corp., 482
F. Supp. 1060, 1069-71 (E.D. Va. 1980).
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One of the most interesting legal issues in connection with iden-
tifying the potential parties to a toxic substances case occurs when
a plaintiff is aware of the particular agent that caused harm, but
cannot establish a causal connection between that agent and a spe-
cific defendant. In Ryan v. Eli Lilly & Co., 124 the plaintiff alleged
that she suffered a pre-cancerous condition caused by prenatal ex-
posure to diethyestilbestrol taken by her mother during pregnancy.
She could not, however, identify the specific drug company that
manufactured and sold the drug ingested by her mother. She
sought to maintain suit against various manufacturers of DES
under theories of alternative liability, concert of action, civil con-
spiracy, enterprise liability and market share liability. Although
the court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment
based upon her failure to identify the manufacturer of the drug
taken by her mother,' 25 each of these theories may have potential
application in other toxic substances cases where a defendant has
similar problems in identifying a defendant.
126
There are any number of techniques for establishing joint torts
and several liability including: vicarious liability; common duty;
concurrent causation of a single, indivisible result which neither
cause would have accomplished alone; concurrent causation of a
single, indivisible result which either would have caused alone;
damage of the same kind which is difficult to apportion; and acts
innocent in themselves that together cause damage. 127 Alternative
liability is a common approach. 2 The typical application of this
theory occurs in the context of two or more tortfeasors who com-
bine to bring about harm to a plaintiff such as two hunters who
fire rifles at the same time, one of whom shoots a plaintiff. The
alternative liability doctrine allows the plaintiff to shift the burden
of proof to the defendants to establish which one caused the al-
124. 514 F. Supp. 1004 (D.S.C. 1981). In a subsequent DES case, the trial judge refused to
utilize market share liability, which was otherwise dictated by California law which con-
trolled the substantive issues, because to do so would conflict with the public policy articu-
lated in Ryan. See Mizell v. Eli Lilly & Co., 526 F. Supp. 589 (D.S.C. 1981) (plaintiff was
born in and cancer was diagnosed in California).
125. Ryan v. Eli Lilly & Co., 514 F. Supp. 1004, 1007 (D.S.C. 1981).
126. See, e.g., Dombroff v. Armstrong Cork Co., No. 79-14048(12) (11th Jud. Cir. Ct.,
Dade Co., Fla. _).
127. See Prosser, Joint Torts and Several Liability, 25 CAL. L. REv. 413, 429-42 (1937).
See also discussion of Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076 (5th Cir. 1973),
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 869 (1974), and text accompanying notes 371-73 infra.
128. See Summers v. Tice, 33 Cal. 2d 80, 199 P.2d 1 (1948). See generally RESTATEMENT
(SEcoND) OF TORTS § 433B(1966).
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leged harm. If the burden is not met both defendants will be
jointly liable. The application of this theory to DES cases has gen-
erally been limited because of the following arguments: there are a
large number of potential defendants and not all of them are
brought into the lawsuit; the defendants do not have any greater
access to information concerning who sold the drug and are dealing
with the same level of uncertainty as the plaintiff; there is no spe-
cific information that any one of the named defendants sold the
drug that allegedly caused the harm; and the activities of the de-
fendants are different in time and place.1 9
Concert of action is another theory that may be used to solve a
plaintiff's identification problem.1 30 Under this approach a group
of defendants may be liable if they act in concert pursuant to a
common design, knowingly give substantial assistance to others en-
gaged in breaching a duty or give substantial assistance while
breaching a separate duty to a plaintiff. The typically cited exam-
ple of concert of action involves a suit brought by an innocent per-
son who is injured as a result of a drag race. The specific facts
connected with defendants' actions are usually controlling and
courts have been inconsistent in applying this theory in DES
cases.131 Reasons cited for not applying this theory have included
lack of evidence of anti-social behavior, passage of time between
conduct complained of and subsequent activities, lack of a tacit
understanding or a common plan, joinder of fewer than all poten-
tial defendants, large numbers of defendants and evidence only of
mere manufacturing activities with similar economic results.3 2 On
the other hand, one jury has found that there was sufficient evi-
dence of concerted action to hold the defendant manufacturers lia-
ble for failing to make sufficient tests and for marketing DES with-
out adequate warnings."'3
Closely related to concert of action is a theory of civil conspiracy
also considered in Ryan v. Eli Lilly & Co."" Plaintiffs alleged that
the named manufacturers of DES conspired to fraudulently mis-
represent the benefits of DES or acquiesed in such misrepresenta-
129. See Sindell v. Abbott Labs., 26 Cal. 3d at 603-04, 607 P.2d at 931, 163 Cal. Rptr. at
139.
130. See generally RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 876 (1966).
131. Bernbaum, DES Concert-of-Action Theory: New Cases Bring New Confusion, Nat'l
L.J., May 4, 1981, at 31, col. 1.
132. Sindell v. Abbott Labs., 26 Cal. 3d at 608, 607 P.2d 932-33, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 141.
133. Bichler v. Eli Lilly & Co., 79 A.D.2d 317, 436 N.Y.S. 2d 625 (1981).
134. 514 F. Supp. 1004 (D.S.C. 1981).
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tion. On motion for summary judgment the court found that there
was no evidence of an agreement by the named defendants to com-
mit a criminal act or intentional tort pursuant to a common
scheme. 135
Other plaintiffs have suggested that there is a concept of "enter-
prise liability" that should be appropriate for assisting plaintiffs to
identify defendants in these kinds of cases.'36 This type of enter-
prise liability should be distinguished from the larger social theory
that enterprises should bear the risk of loss for all harm caused by
that enterprise. 3 7 Instead, enterprise liability in this latter context
refers to the legal theory proposed in Hall v. Du Pont.'1 This the-
ory proposes that various overwhelming social policies would be
better served ty shifting the risk of loss to an offending industry as
a whole rather than maintaining the risk of loss on injured con-
sumers.139 In the DES cases there has been no support for this
approach for a number of reasons including the large number of
defendants, the presence of pervasive governmental regulation, and
a dearth of legal precedent.4 0
The most recent suggestion by plaintiffs to surmount the diffi-
culties of identifying defendants has been for "market share liabil-
ity.' 4' According to this theory, if a plaintiff suffered harm
caused by a toxic substance but cannot identify the manufacturer
of that substance, then the plaintiff may sue a substantial portion
of the entire industry producing the substance and recover dam-
ages to be paid by each manufacturer in proportion to respective
shares of the market for that substance. This doctrine is based
upon the express social policies of providing the most appropriate
incentives for product safety and of placing liability on the parties
most capable of bearing compensation costs. Objections to this the-
ory have included the lack of precedent, unfairness to some defen-
dants and plaintiffs, and that it is counter to such social policies as
135. Id. at 1007.
136. 26 Cal. 3d at 608, 607 P.2d at 933-34, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 141-42.
137. Klemme, The Enterprise Liability Theory of Torts, 47 COLO. L. REv. 153 (1976).
138. 345 F. Supp. 353 (E.D.N.Y. 1972) (actions against explosives manufacturers for inju-
ries to children from blasting caps).
139. See Note supra note 10, at 1)00.
140. See Abel v. Eli Lilly & Co., 94 Mich. App. 59, 289 N.W.2d 20, 27 (1979). See also
Coggins, Industry-Wide Liability, 13 SUFFOLK L. Rlv. 980 (1979).
141. Sindell v. Abbott Labs., 26 Cal. 3d at 611-14, 607 P.2d at 936-38, 163 Cal. Rptr. at
144-46.
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the encouragement of medical research.'42
V. COMMON LAW THEORIES OF RECOVERY
The potentially available theories of liability' are limited only
by the fertility of the imagination of counsel for a plaintiff. This
section will refer to over twenty separate approaches for there is no
single theory that suits all toxic substances cases. The argument
has been made that none of the existing causes of action ade-
quately meet the needs of a plaintiff injured by a toxic substance
and that there should be a new theory developed to accommodate
the unique characteristics of these cases.14 4  There is little debate
that each of the existing theories of liability has relative strengths
and weaknesses. In selecting a particular theory for any case, coun-
sel normally finds crucial distinctions from theory to theory based
upon the applicable statute of limitations, the subject matter cov-
ered by each theory, the requisite relationship among the parties,
the difficulty of proof of the elements of a cause of action, available
defenses and potential damages. No plaintiff has convinced a court
that the collective weaknesses of the existing theories of recovery
mandate the creation of a new cause of action.
Probably the most popular single cause of action asserted in per-
sonal injury cases involving toxic substances is strict liability in
tort. 4 5 Cases involving lung disorders,146 exposure to pesticides, 4"
142. See note 139 supra.
143. See generally Blanchard & Adams, North Carolina's New Products Liability Act: A
Critical Analysis, 16 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 171 (1980); Byrd, Recovery for Mental Anguish
in North Carolina, 58 N.C.L. REV. 435 (1980); Crystal, Consumer Product Warranty Litiga-
tion in South Carolina, 31 S.C.L. Rev. 293 (1980); Davis, Product Liability Under Section
402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts and the Model Uniform Product Liability Act,
16 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 513 (1980); Digges, Product Liability in Maryland Revisited, 7 U.
BALT. L. REV. 1 (1977); Farrell, The Law of Medical Malpractice in West Virginia, 82 W.
VA. L. REV. 251 (1979); James & Gray, Misrepresentation, Part I, 37 MD. L. REV. 286
(1977); James & Gray, Misrepresentation, Part II, 37 MD. L. REV. 488 (1978); Note, Vir-
ginia Should Adopt Strict Tort Recovery in Products Liability Suits Involving Personal
Injury, 14 U. RICH. L. REV. 391 (1980).
144. See P. RHEINGOLD & R. JACOBSON, The Toxic Tort Cause of Action: Law and Proce-
dure, in Toxic TORTS 1 (P. Rheingold, N. Landau, & M. Canavan ed. 1977); CONGRESSIONAL
RESEARCH SERVICE FOR SENATE COMM. ON ENVIRONMENTAL AND PUBLIC WORKS, 96TH CONG.,
2d SESS., SIX CASE STUDIES OF COMPENSATION FOR TOXIC SUBSTANCES POLLUTION: ALABAMA,
CALIFORNIA, MICHIGAN, MISSOURI, NEW JERSEY, AND TEXAS (Comm. Print 1980).
145. A reading of the Last Report Letter Section 6f [1974] 2 PROD. LIAB. REP. (CCH) will
demonstrate the number and variety of such strict liability actions.
146. See White v. Johns-Manville Corp., 662 F.2d 234 (4th Cir. 1981); Borel v. Fibreboard
Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 869 (1974).
147. See In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 506 F. Supp. 762 (E.D.N.Y.), rev'd, 635
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ingestion of drugs'4 s and incidence of cancer 149 have relied heavily
upon strict liability in tort. These cases typically have involved
allegations that corporations or governments have put defective
products into the stream of commerce that caused harm to persons
or property thereby subjecting them to strict liability.'5 eAllegations
of defect have been based upon the way a product was manufac-
tured,151 the way it was designed, 52 the fact that it was sold, s53 the
instructions 54 and warnings' 55 either accompanying or not accom-
panying a product, and the overall promotion for sale of a
product.158
Strict liability in tort has been a popular theory because a plain-
tiff is not required to prove that a defendant knew or should have
known of the defective nature of the product.157  Defendants also
are stripped of some of the typical defenses available under other
negligence based causes of action.158  Aside from the fact that sev-
eral states have not adopted strict liability in tort or have limited
its applicability,'59 there are a number of weaknesses common to it
and to tort actions in general. A plaintiff must prove that an iden-
F.2d 987 (2d Cir. 1980), review denied, 50 U.S.L.W. 3483 (U.S. Dec. 15, 1981)(No. 80-1882);
United States v. Allen. 494 F. Supp. 107 (W.D. Wis. 1980).
148. See Werner v. Upjohn Co., 628 F.2d 848 (4th Cir. 1980); Chambers v. G.D. Searle &
Co., 441, F. Supp. 377 (D. Md. 1975), aff'd, 567 F.2d 269 (4th Cir. 1977).
149. See Ryan v. Eli Lilly & Co., 514 F. Supp. 1004 (D.S.C. 1981).
150. Strict liability in these cases is premised upon the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 402A (1965).
151. See Chambers v. G.D. Searle & Co., 441 F. Supp. 377 (D. Md. 1975), afl'd, 567 F.2d
269 (4th Cir. 1977).
152. See Eaton Corp. v. Wright, 281 Md. 80, 375 A.2d 1122 (1977).
153. See Ryan v. Eli Lilly & Co., 514 F. Supp. 1004 (D.S.C. 1981).
154. See Moschkau v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 282 F.2d 878 (7th Cir. 1960); Briggs v. Zotos
Int'l, Inc., 357 F. Supp. 89 (E.D. Va. 1973); Zigler v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., -
N.C. App. -, 280 S.E.2d 510 (1981). The latter two cases were tried on common law negli-
gence counts.
155. See Fellows v. USV Pharmaceutical Corp., 502 F. Supp. 297 (D. Md. 1980).
156. See Werner v. Upjohn Co., 628 F.2d 848 (4th Cir. 1980) (allegation that manufac-
turer's overselling of a drug negated the warnings).
157. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A(2)(a) (1965).
158. See Singer v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 461 F.2d 288 (7th Cir.) (assumption of unknown
risk), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 878 (1972); Briggs v. Zotos Int'l Inc., 357 F. Supp. 89 (E.D. Va.
1973) (contributory negligence); Ruggeri v. Minnesota Min. & Mfg. Co., 63 Ill. App. 3d 525,
380 N.E.2d 445 (1978) (assumption of risk).
159. Within the states comprising the Fourth Circuit of the United States Court of Ap-
peals, Maryland, South Carolina and West Virginia have adopted strict liability in tort. See
Phipps v. General Motors Corp., 278 Md. 337, 363 A.2d 955 (1976); S. C. CODE § 15-73-10
(1976); Morningstar v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., - W. Va-, 253 S.E.2d 666 (1979) (without
the unreasonably dangerous requirement of § 402A). To date, North Carolina and Virginia
have not adopted strict liability in tort.
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tifiable product was sold or put into the stream of commerce by an
identifiable defendant in the business of selling that product,1 0
and in some jurisdictions, the plaintiff must be either a user or
consumer of that product.161 A plaintiff must usually prove that
the specific defendant's product was the proximate cause of the
physical harm to person or property. 162 In some jurisdictions eco-
nomic loss is not recoverable in the absence of physical harm.1 3 It
can also be argued that there is little difference between proving a
design or marketing defect and proving negligence. Some courts
have made the element of scienter a prerequisite to recovery under
the theory of strict liability in tort for both design and marketing
defects.'
The variety of fact situations that are amenable to the applica-
tion of negligence is astonishing. Aside from the previously enu-
merated approaches of alleging manufacturing,6 5 design"6 and
marketing defects, 6 7 negligence can be used as a basis of recovery
because of problems in the operation of machinery or the manufac-
turing process as a whole. 68 Failure to inspect the product, plant
or environment;169 failure to test, maintain or repair a product or
process;170 or simply a failure to act reasonably have been used as
160. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 402A, Comments e & f (1965).
161. See Armstrong Rubber Co. v. Urquidez, 570 S.W.2d 374 (Tex. 1978) (test driver was
not a consumer).
162. See Ryan v. Eli Lilly & Co., 514 F. Supp. 1004 (D.S.C. 1981).
163. See Seely v. White Motor Co., 63 Cal. 2d 9, 403 P.2d 145, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17 (1965);
Alfred N. Koplin & Co., v. Chrysler Corp., 491 Ill. App. 3d 194, 364 N.E.2d 100 (1977).
Contra, Cova v. Harley Davidson Motors Co., 26 Mich. App. 602, 182 N.W.2d 800 (1970)
(minority rule).
164. Birnbaum, Unmasking the Test for Design Defect: From Negligence [To Warranty]
to Strict Liability to Negligence, 33 VAND. L. REv. 593 (1980).
165. See American Cyanamid Co. v. Fields, 204 F.2d 151 (4th Cir. 1953).
166. See Eaton Corp. v. Wright, 281 Md. 80, 375 A.2d 1122 (1977); Zigler v. E.I. Du Pont
De Nemours & Co., - N.C. App. -, 280 S.E.2d 510 (1981).
167. See Werner v. Upjohn Co., 628 F.2d 848 (4th Cir. 1980); Barnes v. Litton Indus.
Prods., Inc., 555 F.2d 1184 (4th Cir. 1977); Salmon v. Parke, Davis & Co., 520 F.2d 1359 (4th
Cir. 1975); Olgers v. Sika Chem. Corp., 437 F.2d 90 (4th Cir. 1971); Whitehurst v. Revlon,
Inc., 307 F. Supp. 918 (E.D. Va. 1969); Moran v. Faberge, Inc., 273 Md. 538, 332 A.2d 11
(1975); Zigler v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., - N.C. App. - , 280 S.E.2d 510
(1981); Davis v. Silco, 47 N.C. App. 237, 267 S.E.2d 354, review denied, 301 N.C. 234, 283
S.E.2d 131 (1980). See also Werber & Trombetta, Product Liability: The Potential Liability
of the Advertising Agency, 24 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 413 (1975).
168. See Kneece v. City of Columbia, 128 S.C. 375, 123 S.E. 100 (1924); Harless v. Work-
man, 145 W. Va. 266, 114 S.E.2d 548 (1960).
169. See Blessing v. United States, 447 F. Supp. 1160 (E.D. Pa. 1978).
170. See Gardner v. Q.H.S., Inc., 448 F.2d 238 (4th Cir. 1971); Gonzalez v. Virginia-Caro-
lina Chem. Co., 239 F. Supp. 567 (E.D.S.C. 1965); Whitley v. Cubberly, 24 N.C. App. 204,
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the basis of negligence claims by plaintiffs.1 7 ' Aside from cases
against manufacturers or distributors of products, negligence the-
ory has been used most commonly in the context of professional
malpractice and premises liability.17 2 In circumstances where a
plaintiff is unable to recover against parties involved in putting a
product into the stream of commerce, there are a number of alter-
native defendants who are potentially subject to liability under a
negligence theory. Individuals associated with medical care,'
7 3
safety inspections,'7 4 premises design ' 5 and related activities 176
have been included as defendants for malpractice or negligence.
As is indicated by the range of potential fact situations, the
greatest asset of a negligence action is the breadth of its applicabil-
ity to circumstances involving personal injuries caused by toxic
substances. In some instances the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur has
been particularly helpful in assisting a plaintiff to establish a negli-
gence cause of action.17 7 Its use is restricted, however, by relatively
short statutes of limitation and statutes of respose,17 8 rigorous
standards of proof,179 and substantial defenses. 180
Related to negligent failure to warn and instruct is a range of
representational theories that have received little attention in toxic
substances cases, particularly in the context of fraudulent conceal-
210 S.E.2d 289 (1974).
171. For example, liability has been based upon not foreseeing that someone might ingest
an otherwise safe product. See Barnes v. Litton Indus. Prods., Inc., 555 F.2d 1184 (4th Cir.
1977); Spruill v. Boyle-Midway, Inc., 308 F.2d 79 (4th Cir. 1962).
172. See notes 117 & 119 supra. See also Harig v. Johns-Manville Prods, Corp., 284 Md.
70, 394 A.2d 299 (1978) (secretary working in asbestos-containing building products
warehouse).
173. See Werner v. Upjohn Co., 628 F.2d 848 (4th Cir. 1980); Salmon v. Parke, Davis &
Co., 520 F.2d 1359 (4th Cir. 1975); Bastiste v. American Homes Prods. Corp., 32 N.C. App.
1, 231 S.E.2d 269 (1977); Whitely v. Cubberly, 24 N.C. App. 204, 210 S.E.2d 289 (1974).
174. See Burdette v. Burlington Indus., Inc., No. 79-2116-7 (D.S.C. July 10, 1981).
175. See Strong v. Nebraska Natural Gas Co., 476 F. Supp. 1170 (D. Neb. 1979).
176. See McDougle v. Woodward & Lothrop, Inc., 312 F.2d 21 (4th Cir. 1963) (beauty
salon which administered permanent wave).
177. Id.
178. See Schnurman v. United States, 490 F. Supp. 429 (E.D. Va. 1980); Locke v. Johns-
Manville Corp., 219 Va. 951, 275 S.E.2d 900 (1981).
179. See Olgers v. Sika Chem. Corp., 437 F.2d 90 (4th Cir. 1971); Best v. United States,
505 F. Supp. 48 (E.D.N.C. 1980).
180. See Werner v. Upjohn Co., 628 F.2d 848 (4th Cir. 1980) (intervening actor); Spruill v.
Boyle-Midway, Inc., 308 F.2d 79 (4th Cir. 1962) (intervening actor); Stanback v. Parke, Da-
vis & Co., 502 F. Supp. 767 (W.D. Va. 1980) (intervening actor); Zigler v. E.I. Du Pont De
Nemours & Co., - N.C. App_, 280 S.E.2d 510 (1981)(contributory negligence).
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ment. 181 Plaintiffs may have grounds for alleging innocent misrep-
resentation,182 negligent misrepresentation,'"3 fraud'" or express
warranty""5 to establish a cause of action. The elements of most of
these theories are relatively inexpensive to prove and are within
the normal range of experience of a jury. A plaintiff must typically
have, however, some type of personal relationship with a defendant
in order to avail himself of one of these theories.8 6 At the same
time a plaintiff may have substantial difficulty in meeting require-
ments of specificity and reliance mandated by these causes of
action.18 7
If a plaintiff can find some basis for establishing negligence per
se, a number of the difficulties present under negligence and repre-
sentational theories could be surmounted. Virtually every aspect of
the business of placing products into the stream of commerce has
some form of federal, state or local regulation. If a plaintiff can
locate a violation of one of these regulations by a defendant, the
substantial problems for a plaintiff in proving negligence or a de-
fect can be eliminated. 88 In one case, for example, a manufacturer
was potentially liable for damages sustained by placing toxic
materials into a city sewage system in violation of a municipal or-
dinance setting toxicity levels for waste.8 9
Another theory of recovery that does not present the problem of
proving culpability is strict liability for abnormally dangerous or
ultra-hazardous activity. 90 The distinguishing characteristics be-
181. See, e.g., Burdette v. Burlington Indus., Inc., No. 79-2116-7 (D.S.C. July 10, 1981)
(plaintiff's complaint alleged that the employer had concealed information on availability of
workmen's compensation benefits).
182. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402B (1965).
183. See Davis v. Silco, 47 N.C. App. 237, 267 S.E.2d 354, review denied, 301 N.C. 234,
283 S.E.2d 131 (1980).
184. See Chambers v. G.D. Searle & Co., 441 F. Supp. 377 (D. Md. 1975), aff'd, 576 F.2d
269 (4th Cir. 1977).
185. See 47 N.C. App. 237, 267 S.E.2d 354, review denied, 301 N.C. 234, 283 S.E.2d 131
(1980).
186. Chambers v. G.D. Searle & Co., 441 F. Supp. 377 (D. Md. 1975), aff'd, 576 F.2d 269
(4th Cir. 1977).
187. See Whittington v. Eli Lilly & Co., 333 F. Supp. 98 (S.D.W. Va. 1971); Davis v. Silco,
47 N.C. App. 237, 267 S.E.2d 354, review denied, 301 N.C. 234, 283 S.E.2d 131 (1980).
188. See Gonzalez v. Virginia-Carolina Chem. Co., 239 F. Supp. 567 (E.D.S.C. 1965) (vio-
lation of labelling law). See also Williams v. Pendleton Mfg. Co., 244 S.C. 228, 136 S.E.2d
291 (1964) (prejudicial error to instruct jury on statute because it might implant the notion
that violator was absolutely liable).
189. Springer v. Joseph Schlitz Brewing Co., 510 F.2d 468 (4th Cir. 1975).
190. See generally Rylands v. Fletcher, L.R. 3 H.L. 330 (1868) (unnatural use); RESTATE-
MENT OF TORTS §§ 519 & 520 (1939) (ultrahazardous); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§
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tween this theory and strict liability in tort are the nature of the
activity covered and the lack of the need to prove a defect.191 Most
courts have increased the number of potential plaintiffs and
hazards by using a foreseeability standard. Some courts have re-
laxed the standard of proof for proximate cause and have elimi-
nated contributory negligence as a defense. 92 Other states have,
however, limited this theory to unnatural activities involving phys-
ical invasion of property and have circumscribed the range of ac-
tivities generally considered to be abnormally dangerous. 93
In the event a defendant is accused of particularly egregious con-
duct theories such as the tort of outrage, 94 gross reckless con-
duct 95 or intentional tort 96 may be available. The tort of outrage
may be particularly helpful in those instances where an individual
does not suffer an immediately diagnosable personal injury but has
an increased chance of contracting a physical problem at a future
date.197 All of these theories, however, involve fact situations that
are either relatively unusual or extremely difficult to prove.
Because of the relatively short statute of limitations for tort
causes of action, some plaintiffs have attempted to use contract
actions,9 " such as breach of the implied warranty of merchant-
ability199 and implied warranty of fitness for a particular pur-
519 & 520 (1977) (abnormally dangerous).
191. See, e.g., Yommer v. McKenzie, 255 Md. 220, 257 A.2d 138 (1969) (operating service
station); Wells v. Whitaker, 207 Va. 616, 151 S.E.2d 422 (1966) (storing explosives).
192. See Frost v. Berkeley Phosphate Co., 42 S.C. 402, 20 S.E. 280 (1894). See also
Mowrer v. Ashland Oil & Ref. Co., 518 F.2d 659 (7th Cir. 1975); Indiana Harbor Belt R.R.
Co. v. American Cyanamid Co., 517 F. Supp. 314 (N.D. Ill. 1981).
193. See notes 191 and 192 supra. See generally Wright v. Masonite Corp., 368 F.2d 661
(4th Cir. 1966) (applying North Carolina law), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 934 (1967); Toy v.
Atlantic Gulf & Pac. Co., 176 Md. 197, 4 A.2d 757 (1939); Susquehanna Fertilizer Co. v.
Malone, 73 Md. 268, 20 A. 900 (1890); Weaver Mercantile Co. v. Thurmond, 68 W. Va. 530,
70 S.E. 126 (1911).
194. See generally RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 46 (1965) (reckless conduct and its
relation to the tort of emotional distress).
195. Id. See Mink v. University of Chicago, 460 F. Supp. 713 (N.D. Ill. 1978). See also
Harris v. Jones, 281 Md. 560, 380 A.2d 281 (1977); Ford v. Hutson, - S.C. -, 276 S.E.2d
776 (1981).
196. See Dickens v. Puryear, 302 N.C. 437, 276 S.E.2d 325 (1981); Womack v. Eldridge,
215 Va. 338, 210 S.E.2d 145 (1975). See generally RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS §§ 13-
16 (1965)(battery).
197. See, e.g., Marrapese v. Rhode Island, 500 F. Supp. 1207 (D.R.I. 1980).
198. See Eaton Corp. v. Wright, 281 Md. 80, 375 A.2d 1122 (1977) (right to
indemnification).
199. See Stanback v. Parke, Davis & Co., 502 F. Supp. 767 (W.D. Va. 1980); Chambers v.
G.D. Searle & Co., 441 F. Supp. 377 (D. Md. 1975), af'd, 576 F.2d 269 (4th Cir. 1977); Eaton
Corp. v. Wright, 281 Md. 80, 375 A.2d 1122 (1977); Bastiste v. American Home Prods. Corp.,
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pose.200 Although it may be easier to prove that a defendant has
violated these contractual standards, these theories have limited
applicability because of the requirement of some type of special
relationship between plaintiff and defendant.20 1 In some jurisdic-
tions, it may also be necessary to establish privity and notice, and
there may be various disclaimers available to defendants to limit
the measure of damages. 20 2
Some plaintiffs have sought to use land based actions to avoid
the problems inherent in the various strict liability, negligence,
misrepresentation and contract theories. Trespass, 2°s public nui-
sance,2G4 private nuisance,20 5 and riparian ownership 206 approaches
have met with varying degrees of success. Under circumstances
where there have been no overt personal injuries but some type of
damage to property, plaintiffs have found these theories most ap-
propriate. They are also potentially helpful when a plaintiff has
suffered the potential for future personal injuries accompanied by
an invasion of the use or enjoyment of land.20 7 Under these theo-
ries there is often a substantially easier standard of proof, a longer
statute of limitations, and the defenses available are not as strin-
gent as in tort and contract cases.
If a plaintiff can establish the applicability of one of these theo-
ries to the circumstances of a particular case, good faith and con-
tributory negligence may not be available as potential defenses. 208
32 N.C. App. 1, 231 S.E.2d 269 (1977).
200. See Gardner v. Q.H.S., Inc., 448 F.2d 238 (1971); Fellows v. USV Pharmaceutical
Corp., 502 F. Supp. 297 (D. Md. 1980); Briggs v. Zotos Int'l Inc., 357 F. Supp. 89 (E.D. Va.
1973). See also Davis v. Silco, 47 N.C. App. 237, 267 S.E.2d 354, review denied, 301 N.C.
234, 283 S.E.2d 131 (1980); Reid v. Eckerds Drugs, Inc., 40 N.C. App. 476, 253 S.E.2d 344
(1979); Bastiste v. American Home Prods. Corp., 32 N.C. App. 1, 231 S.E.2d 269 (1977).
201. For example, in Bastiste v. American Home Prods. Corp., 32 N.C. App. 1, 231 S.E.2d
269 (1977), the plaintiff unsuccessfully argued that a doctor prescribing a drug was a
"seller" under the UCC and that warranty provisions should apply.
202. See Davis v. Silco, 47 N.C. App. 237, 267 S.E.2d 354, review denied, 301 N.C. 234,
283 S.E.2d 131 (1980); Whittington v. Eli Lilly & Co., 333 F. Supp. 98 (S.D.W. Va. 1971);
Blum v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 268 F. Supp. 906 (D. Md. 1965).
203. See generally RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS §§ 157-66 (1965).
204. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 821B & 821C (1979).
205. See generally RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF TORTS § 821 (1979).
206. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 841-64 (1979) (riparian owner-
ship). See also Davis, Theories of Water Pollution Litigation, 1971 Wis. L. REv. 738.
207. See Leatherbury v. Gaylord Fuel Corp., 276 Md. 367, 347 A.2d 826 (1975); Hendrick-
son v. Standard Oil Co., 126 Md. 577, 95 A. 153 (1915); Causby v. High Penn Oil Co., 244
N.C. 235, 93 S.E.2d 79 (1956). See also Village of Wilsonville v. SCA Servs., Inc., 77 IMI. App.
3d 618, 396 N.E.2d 552 (1979), af'd, 86 IMI. 2d 1, 426 N.E.2d 824 (1981).
208. See generally RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 840B (1979) (contributory negli-
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Under a trespass theory, the applicable statute of limitations is
typically longer than the tort statute.2 °9 In a nuisance action a
plaintiff may choose between proving either intentional210 or negli-
gent interference211 and may show an indirect invasion to land.212
On the other hand, the trespass requirements of intentional inva-
sion of property and possessory interest in land have precluded a
large number of plaintiffs from suit.2 13 At the same time, individ-
ual plaintiffs have had substantial difficulty meeting the require-
ments of standing under public nuisance214 and have also been un-
able to meet the balancing test inherent in the nuisance
standard.215 Actions for private nuisance have been more success-
ful even though some plaintiffs have been unable to recover dam-
ages because of the necessity of proving some type of interest in
land and substantial and unreasonable harm.16
gence is only a defense if defendant's conduct was unintentional).
209. See notes 39-50 supra.
210. See Morgan v. High Penn Oil Co., 238 N.C. 185, 77 S.E.2d 682 (1953); Barnes v.
Graham Quarries, Inc., 204 Va. 414, 132 S.E.2d 395 (1963).
211. See Wright v. Masonite Corp., 368 F.2d 661 (4th Cir. 1966); Welborn v. Page, 247
S.C. 554, 148 S.E.2d 375 (1966).
212. See Gorman v. Sabo, 210 Md. 155, 122 A.2d 475 (1956); Jackson v. Shawnign Elec.
Prod. Co., 132 Md. 128, 103 A. 453 (1918); Watts v. Pama Mfg. Co., 256 N.C. 611, 124 S.E.2d
809 (1962); Young v. City of Ashville, 241 N.C. 618, 86 S.E.2d 408 (1955).
213. See Zimmerman v. Shreeve, 59 Md. 357 (1882); Hall v. De Weld Mica Corp., 244
N.C. 182, 93 S.E.2d 56 (1956); Finger v. Rex Spinning Co., 190 N.C. 74, 128 S.E. 467 (1925);
Rhyne v. Flint Mfg. Co., 182 N.C. 489, 109 S.E. 376 (1921); Conestee Mills v. City of Green-
ville, 160 S.C. 10, 158 S.E. 113 (1931); Seventeen, Inc. v. Pilot Life Ins. Co., 215 Va. 74, 205
S.E.2d 648 (1974); Bartlett v. Grasselli Chem. Co., 92 W. Va. 445, 115 S.E. 451 (1922).
214. See Hampton v. North Carolina Pulp Co., 223 N.C. 535, 27 S.E.2d 538 (1943); Inter-
national Shoe Co. v. Heatwole, 126 W. Va. 888, 30 S.E.2d 537 (1944).
215. See Thropp v. Harpers Ferry Paper Co., 142 F. 690 (4th Cir. 1902); Pendergrast v.
Aiken, 293 N.C. 201, 236 S.E.2d 787 (1977); Watts v. Pama Mfg. Co., 256 N.C. 611, 124
S.E.2d 809 (1962); Rhyne v. Flint Mfg. Co., 182 N.C. 489, 109 S.E. 376 (1921); Dill v. Dance
Freight Lines, 247 S.C. 159, 146 S.E.2d 574 (1966); Winget v. Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc., 242
S.C. 152, 130 S.E.2d 363 (1963); Young v. Brown, 212 S.C. 156, 46 S.E.2d 673 (1948); Smith
v. Pittston Co., 203 Va. 711, 127 S.E.2d 79 (1962); Alkers v. Mathieson Alkali Works, 151
Va. 1, 144 S.E, 492 (1928); Shoffner v. Sutherland, 111 Va. 298, 68 S.E. 996 (1910); Board of
Commissioners v. Elm Grove Mining Co., 122 W. Va. 442, 9 S.E.2d 813 (1940).
In riparian actions, the "comparative convenience" doctrine is sometimes used to weigh
the interests of the parties. See Livezey v. Town of Bel Air, 174 Md. 568, 199 A. 838 (1938)
(accepted); Williams v. Haile Gold Mining Co., 85 S.C. 1, 66 S.E. 117 (1909) (rejected);
Arminius Chem. Co. v. Landrum, 113 Va. 7, 73 S.E. 459 (1912) (rejected); Day v. Louisville
Coal & Coke Co., 60 W. Va. 27, 53 S.E. 776 (1906) (rejected).
216. See Bostick v. Smoot Sand & Gravel Corp., 154 F. Supp. 744 (D. Md. 1957); Balti-
more v. Warren Mfg. Co., 59 Md. 96 (1882); Watts v. Pama Mfg. Co., 256 N.C. 611, 124
S.E.2d 809 (1962); Young v. Brown, 212 S.C. 156, 46 S.E.2d 673 (1948); Mahoney v. Walter,
205 S.E.2d 692 (W. Va. 1974); Parkersburg Builders Material Co. v. Barrack, 118 W. Va.
608, 191 S.E. 368 (1967).
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Statute of limitations problems and restrictive views by some
courts have led plaintiffs to seek more novel theories of liability
under admiralty217 and federal common law,218 the public trust
doctrine 219 and a new tort for personal injuries caused by toxic
substances. 220 The asbestos cases have generated a substantial
number of appellate opinions concerning the applicability of admi-
ralty law to personal injuries suffered by ship workers.221 In the
Agent Orange cases and in numerous nuisance suits, plaintiffs have
attempted to develop a federal common law cause of action that
would not suffer from the same perceived problems as the law of
the various states.222 One of the most innovative approaches has
been to develop a cause of action based upon the theory that the
government has an affirmative duty to preserve the public's re-
sources.22 Under this approach, each corporate member of society
would also have a duty to insure that their activities did not harm
public resources including the health and welfare of individuals.224
The most overt approach to recovery has been the suggestion of
a new theory of liability which would have universal applicability
to causes of action arising from personal injuries caused by toxic
substances. 225 Under this theory a plaintiff would recover for dam-
ages if he could prove that he had contracted a disease, that the
217. See generally Moore v. Hampton Roads Sanitation Dist. Comm'n, 557 F.2d 1030
(4th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1012 (1978). Usually, negligence concepts are applied
in admiralty actions. Ancarrow v. City of Richmond, 600 F.2d 443 (4th Cir. 1978), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 992 (1979); McMahan v. The Panamolga, 127 F. Supp. 659 (D. Md. 1955).
The Limitation of Liability Act, 46 U.S.C. §§ 183-96 (1971), may limit recovery to the ship
ownerd interest in the vessel and her cargo. See, e.g., Complaint of Harbor Towing Corp.,
335 F. Supp. 1150 (D. Md. 1971).
218. Although there is a general federal common law, Miree v. DeKalb County, 433 U.S.
25 (1977), the federal common law of nuisance does not permit private suits. Committee for
Consideration of Jones Falls Sewage Sys. v. Train, 375 F. Supp. 1148 (D. Md. 1974), aff'd,
539 F.2d 1006 (4th Cir. 1976).
219. See YANNACONNE, COHEN & DAVISON, ENVIRONMENTAL RIGHTS AND REMEDnEs (1972);
Note, The Public Trust Doctrine: A New Approach to Environmental Preservation, 81 W.
VA. L. REv. 455 (1979).
220. See Rheingold & Jacobson, supra note 144.
221. See White v. Johns-Manville Corp., 662 F.2d 234 (4th Cir. 1981) (reversing trial
court's ruling that installing insulation on ships is not a traditional maritime activity).
222. In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 475 F. Supp. 928 (E.D.N.Y. 1979) (denied
cause of action under federal constitution and federal statutes), 506 F. Supp. 737 (E.D.N.Y.)
(upheld cause of action based on federal common law), rev'd, 635 F.2d 987 (2d Cir. 1980),
review denied, 50 U.S.L.W. 3483 (U.S. Dec. 15, 1981) (No. 80-1882).
223. See State of Maryland, Dept. of Nat. Res. v. Amerada Hess Corp., 350 F. Supp. 1060
(D. Md. 1972). See also In re Steuart Transp., 495 F. Supp. 38 (E.D. Va. 1980).
224. See YANNACONNE, COHEN & DAVISON, supra note 219.
225. Rheingold & Jacobson, supra note 144.
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disease had some causal relationship to a toxic substance, and that
the toxic substance was a substantial factor in contributing to the
disease. The burden of proof would then shift to the defendants
who produced the toxic substance to prove that it was not unsafe
or, if unavoidably unsafe, that there had been adequate testing and
warnings. If there were multiple defendants involved in the placing
of the toxic substance into the environment, the burden of proof
would shift to those defendants to show that they did not contrib-
ute to cause plaintiff's injury.22 6 Actions for contribution or indem-
nity appear in virtually every toxic substances case involving mul-
tiple defendants. In most states there are common law or
statutory provisions that allow joint tortfeasors or otherwise liable
parties to seek reimbursement for part or all of a judgment against
third parties who have a certain level of liability. 227 Many defen-
dants have also sought contribution or indemnity from govern-
ments. Under the Federal Tort Claims Act the United States
waived its immunity for certain third party actions.22 But, there is
a debate concerning governmental immunity for suits against the
United States for injuries to federal employees covered by the Fed-
eral Employees Compensation Act (FECA).229 Suits based upon an
independent relationship between the United States and a
tortfeasor may be allowed notwithstanding the exclusive remedy
provision of FECA and thus, recovery under alternative theories
such as implied warranty may be available in third party
actions.230
VI. STATUTORY AND CONSTITUTIONAL CAUSES OF ACTION
23 1
A much larger number of persons who are injured by exposure to
226. Id.
227. See, e.g., Davis v. Silco, 47 N.C. App. 237, 267 S.E.2d 354, review denied, 301 N.C.
234, 283 S.E.2d 131 (1980). For statutory provisions governing the right to contribution
among tortfeasors, see N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1B-1 (Rep. Vol. 1969) (Uniform Contribution
Among Tortfeasors Act); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-34 (Repl. Vol. 1977) (only for negligence).
See also W. VA. CODE § 55-7-13 (Repl. Vol. 1981).
228. Hart v. Simons, 223 F. Supp. 109 (E.D. Pa. 1963).
229. 5 U.S.C. §§ 8101-93 (1976 & Supp. 1 1978).
230. See Valerio v. American President Lines, Ltd., 112 F. Supp. 202 (S.D.N.Y. 1952).
231. See generally Dolan, Constitutional Torts and the Federal Torts Claims Act, 14 U.
RICH. L. REv. 281 (1980); Kelly, Black Lung Benefit Trusts as a Federal Self-Insurance
Alternative, 82 W. VA. L. REv. 847 (1980); Smith & Newman, The Bases of the Federal
Black Lung Litigation, 83 W. VA. L. REv. 763 (1981); Stevenson, Effect of Virginia Work-
men's Compensation Act Upon the Right of a Third-Party Tortfeasor to Obtain Contribu-
tion from an Employer Whose Concurrent Negligence Caused Employee's Death or Injury,
13 U. RicH. L. REv. 117 (1978); Note, The Public Trust Doctrine: A New Approach to
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toxic substances receive compensation from statutory systems of
recovery rather than from common law suits. 232 State workers'
compensation laws, 23 3 the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers'
Compensation Act,234 the Social Security Act,235 the Federal Tort
Claims Act, 2 3 the Black Lung Benefits Act,23 7 "Superfund,"238 the
Price Anderson Act,239 the Federal Employers' Liability Act, 40 the
2411Federal Employees Compensation Act, various welfare legisla-
tion242 and many other state and federal statutes243 provide the ba-
sis for this recovery. There have been suggestions that federal leg-
islation, similar to the compensation system for coal miner's
pneumoconiosis, should be enacted to provide compensation for in-
juries caused by exposure to specific types of toxic substances.24
The "Superfund" legislation, for example, is designed to meet the
specific problems caused by toxic substances disposal.2 "4  There
have also been suggestions that a national workers' compensation
act or a national enterprise liability system should be initiated in
order to insure recovery for persons injured under any and all cir-
Environmental Preservation, 81 W. VA. L. REv. 455 (1979); Comment, Private Causes of
Action from Federal Statutes: A Strict Standard for Implication by Sole Reliance on Leg-
islative Intent, 14 U. RICH. L. REv. 605 (1980); Comment, Baughman v. Bradford Coal Co.,
Inc.: A Reaffirmation of Citizen Suits Policy Within the Clean Air Act, 82 W. VA. L. REV.
709 (1980).
232. P. BARTH, WORKERS' COMPENSATION & WORK-RELATED ILLNESSES AND DISEASEs 26-44
(1976).
233. See MD. CODE ANN. art. 101 (Repl. Vol. 1979 & Cum. Supp. 1981); N.C. GEN. STAT.
ch. 97 (Repl. Vol. 1979 & Supp. 1981); S.C. CODE tit. 42 (1977 & Cum. Supp. 1980); VA.
CODE ANN. tit. 65.1 (Repl. Vol. 1980 & Cum. Supp. 1981); W. VA. CODE ch. 23 (Repl. Vol.
1981).
234. 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-50 (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
235. 42 U.S.C. §§ 301-1397f (1976 & Supp. II 1978).
236. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671-80 (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
237. 30 U.S.C. §§ 901-62 (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
238. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980,
Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (to be codified in 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-15 and scattered
sections of 42 U.S.C.).
239. 42 U.S.C. § 2210 (1976) (Atomic Energy Damages Act).
240. 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1976) (railroads).
241. 5 U.S.C. §§ 8101-93 (1976 & Supp. II 1978).
242. Such legislation includes public assistance programs (42 U.S.C. § 608 (1976)), Medi-
care (42 U.S.C. § 303 (1976)), Medicaid (42 U.S.C. § 1369a (1976)) and Aid to Families with
Dependent Children (AFDC).
243. See, e.g., 38 U.S.C. § 301 (1976) (disability benefits from the Veterans'
Administration).
244. See, e.g., Congressional Record, H.R. 2740, 96th Cong. 1st Sess., 125 CoNG. REc.
H1220 (1979) (asbestosis); Congressional Record, H.R. 2622, 96th Cong. 1st Sess., 125 CONG.
REc. Hl105 (1979) (byssinosis).
245. Note, Superfund Proposed to Clean Up Hazardous Waste Disasters, 20 NAT. RE-
SOURCES J. 615, 616 (1980). See note 238 supra and accompanying text.
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cumstances. 24 Although there has been little support for a com-
prehensive compensation scheme, there appears to be a trend to-
ward expanding the coverage of state workers' compensation laws
and perhaps toward the passage of national compensation systems
to accommodate specific injuries caused by toxic substances.247
The primary advantages of seeking recovery for toxic substances
injuries under state and federal workers' compensation statutes in-
clude the speed and efficiency of receiving compensation, the ab-
sence of defenses and of the need to prove fault, the availability of
a solvent compensator, and the reserved potential for further re-
covery against third parties.248 The disadvantages include a narrow
scope of recovery, restrictive statutes of limitations and exclusive
remedy provisions against the employer.249
Initially, workers' compensation was limited to accidental or un-
foreseen occurrences. 250 A wool sorter who came in contact with
bacillus would be compensated because he could pinpoint a spe-
cific event which caused his injury,251 but there would be no com-
pensation for lead poisoning since there was no identifiable event
associated with an injury.252 Excluding occupational diseases from
these statutes was justified because a large number of cases could
bankrupt a compensation fund; recovery for occupational disease
was a stranger to common law; workers' compensation was not
designed to be a general health insurance law; and there was a lack
of defined diagnostic tools to identify specific diseases.253
The solution to these problems in most states has been to enact
a variety of defined schedules of occupational diseases that are
covered under a compensation system.2 " As a general rule, the oc-
246. H.R. 16, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979).
247. See National Workers' Compensation Act of 1978: Hearings Before the Subcommit-
tee on Labor of the Senate Committee on Human Resources, 95th Cong. 2d Sess. (1978).
248. "See generally Walton, Workmen's Compensation and the Theory of Professional
Risk, 11 COLUM. L. REv. 36 (1911).
249. See generally Gosney, Whatever Happened to Brown Lung? Compensation for Diffi-
cult to Diagnose Occupational Diseases, 3 INDUS. REL. L.J. 102 (1979).
250. See Workmen's Compensation Act, 1897, 61 Vict., c. 37 (the British statute served as
a model for early American statutes).
251. Turvey v. Brintons, Ltd., [1904] 1 K.B. 328.
252. Steel v. Cammell, Laird & Co., [1905] 2 K.B. 232.
253. Note, Redefinition of Occupational Disease and the Applicable Compensation Stat-
ute - Booker v. Duke Medical Center and Wood v. J.P. Stevens & Co., 16 WAKE FOREST L.
REv. 288, 293 n.45 (1980) (citing 1B LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW, § 41.20
(1978)).
254. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-53 (Repl. Vol. 1979 & Supp. 1980).
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cupational disease must arise out of and in the course of employ-
ment and not be an ordinary disease of life, and there must be a
direct causal connection between the disease and the type and
amount of workplace exposure.255
State workers' compensation laws for occupational disease may
also require that timely notice of injury be given to an employer,
that claims for compensation be filed within a specified period and
that there be a specific period of exposure to a toxic substance.256
Since there may be no specific "event" or "occurrence" associated
with the occupational disease, jurisdictional limitation periods
commence with some event usually unrelated to the contraction of
the disease itself such as hazardous or injurous exposure, manifes-
tation of a disease, awareness of a causal connection, or disable-
255. See MD. CODE ANN. art. 101 §§ 22(a), 23(c) (Repl. Vol. 1979 & Cune. Supp. 1981);
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-53 (Rep. Vol. 1979 & Supp. 1980); S.C. CODE §§ 42-11-10, 42-11-40
(1976); VA. CODE ANN. § 65.1-46 (Repl. Vol. 1980); W. VA. CODE § 23-4-1 (Repl. Vol. 1981).
Common diseases to which the general public is exposed to are not covered under work-
men's compensation, such as contagious diseases contracted from fellow employees or from
hazards equally present outside the job site. It is possible, however, for an ordinary disease
of life to be an occupational disease in certain circumstances. See Booker v. Duke Medical
Center, 297 N.C. 458, 256 S.E.2d 189 (1979) (serum hepatitus contracted by laboratory tech-
nician). Where there is an aggravation of an existing condition or there are multiple causes,
some not work-relateal, a state may reduce benefits to the proportion of the disability due to
work-related causes. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN. art. 101, § 22(c) (Repl. Vol. 1979); S.C. CODE §
42-11-90 (1977). However, it can be difficult to establish the cause of a disease. See Robblee,
The Dark Side of Workers' Compensation: Burdens and Benefits in Occupational Disease
Coverage, 2 INDUS. REL. L.J. 596, 601 (1978).
256. For the applicable notice requirements in the Fourth Circuit, see MD. CODE ANN. art.
101, § 26(a)(1) (Cum. Supp. 1980) (one year); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 97-22 & 97-58(b) (RepL
Vol. 1979) (30 days, except for asbestosis, silicosis, and lead poisoning); S.C. CODE § 42-15-
20 (1976) (90 days); VA. CODE ANN. § 65.1-51 (Repl. Vol. 1980) (60 days).
For the applicable limitations on filing claims, see MD. CODE ANN. art. 101, § 26(a)(4)
(Cum. Supp. 1980) (two years, except three years for pulmonary dust diseases); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 97-58(c) (Repl. Vol. 1979) (two years after death, disability or disablement, except a
claim to compensation for radiation injuries must be filed within two years after the em-
ployee "first suffered incapacity"); S.C. CODE § 42-15-40 (Cum. Supp. 1980) (two years); VA.
CODE ANN. § 65.1-52 (Repl. Vol. 1980) (two years, except three years for coal workers' pneu-
moconiosis, and limitation periods do not apply to radium disability, mesothelioma, and
angiosarcoma).
For the applicable requirements concerning periods of exposure, see N.C. GEN STAT. § 97-
53(6) (Repl. Vol. 1979) (for lead poisoning, there must be exposure for at least 30 days in
the preceding 12 months); S.C. CODE & 42-11-60 (Cum. Supp. 1980) (for byssinosis claims,
there must be at least seven years of exposure) VA. CODE ANN. § 65.1-52 (Repl. Vol. 1980)
("Exposure to the causative hazard of pneumoconiosis for ninety work shifts shall be con-
clusively presumed to constitute injurious exposure"); W. VA. CODE § 23-4-1 (Repl. Vol.
1981) (for occupational pneumoconiosis, there must be exposure for at least two continuous
years during the 10 years immediately preceding last exposure, or for any five years of the
last 15 years preceding last exposure).
280
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ment. 57 Along with these limitations, some state laws specify that
claims must be filed within certain periods of time regardless of
whether or not the disease manifests itself or there is a
disability.258
The most prominent objections raised by employees to recovery
under workers' compensation systems relate to the limitation of
damages and the exclusivity provisions. Most statutory benefits are
substantially below the recovery received in common law personal
injury actions, and culpable employers are often able to minimize
their potential financial exposure.25 9 Attorneys for injured workers
have therefore sought to find and use a variety of statutory and
common law stratagems for circumventing the workers' compensa-
tion restrictions and for obtaining additional recovery against third
parties. Some state statutes provide that an employee can main-
tain a common law action against an employer for an intentional
injury, for various non-physical injuries such as fraud and misrep-
resentation and for the violation of statutory or administrative
standards. 60 Other courts, having found that employers can func-
tion in a dual capacity, have allowed suits against such employers
based on their non-employer role.28 1
257. The triggering event for notifying an employer may be when a worker knows or has
reason to believe he is suffering from an occupational disease. MD. CODE ANN., art. 101, §
26(a)(1) (Cum. Supp. 1981). That event may also be when the employee communicates to
his employer diagnosis of a disease. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-58(b) (Repl. Vol. 1978 & Supp.
1981); VA. CODE ANN. § 65.1-5 (Repl. Vol. 1980). Finally, an employee may have to notify his
employer upon learning that his disease is debilitating. See Drake v. Raybestos-Manhattan,
Inc., 241 S.C. 116, 127 S.E.2d 288 (1962). The period for fling a claim of benefits may com-
mence at the time of disablement (N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-58(c) (Repl. 1978 & Supp. 1981)),
upon disablement or actual knowledge of the causal relationship between the employee's
disease and his occupation (MD. CODE ANN., art. 101, § 26(a) (4) (Cum. Supp. 1981)), or
upon notification of definitive diagnosis (S.C. CODE § 42-15-40 (1976 & Cum. Supp. 1981)).
258. The effect of these provisions are similar to statutes of repose, such as VA. CODE
ANN. § 65.1-52 (Repl. Vol. 1980). See also N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-58 (Repl. Vol. 1979); S.C.
CODE § 42-15-40 (Cum. Supp. 1980).
259. U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, ANALYsis OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION LAws 3, 18-19
(1980). For a general discussion of the exclusive nature of workers' compensation, see Com-
ment, The Exclusive Remedy and Corporate Liability in Workers' Compensation: O'Brien
v. Grumman, 14 GA. L. REv. 368 (1980).
260. See, e.g., Burdette v. Burlington Indus., Inc., No. 79-2116-7 (D.S.C. July 10, 1981);
Bunker v. National Gypsum Co., 77 Ind. App. 200, 406 N.E.2d 1239 (1980).
261. In Kohr v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 505 F. Supp. 159, 161 (E.D. Pa. 1981), a
product liability action against employer as asbestos manufacturer, it was held that "Work-
men's Compensation statutes derogate from the employee's common law rights, and as such,
should not be construed to eliminate rights beyond which the quid pro quo anticipated."
See also Petruska v. Johns-Manville, 83 F.R.D. 39, 40 (E.D. Pa. 1979), where the deceased
worker's wife sued on basis of husband's exposure to asbestos as a result of living near and
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
In Burdette v. Burlington Industries, Inc.,2"2 former textile
workers brought suit outside of workers' compensation alleging
that their employer fraudulently concealed adverse health condi-
tions during their employment and denied them the possibility of
entitlement to workers' compensation benefits. These plaintiffs
also sued various individual doctors employed by their employer
and the workers' compensation carrier for the employer as third
parties, alleging malpractice and negligence. In ruling on a motion
to dismiss, based upon exclusivity provisions, the court allowed the
case to continue under a tort of allegedly depriving the plaintiff of
the benefits provided by the statute. This cause of action was dis-
tinct from the personal injuries suffered during the course of
employment.8 3
Virtually every serious injury sustained by an injured employee
has the potential for lawsuits against a third party. As has been
suggested above, manufacturers, suppliers, health care delivery
personnel, co-employees, inspectors and many others are amenable
to suit.2"4 These third parties in turn may seek contribution or in-
demnity from employers. Asbestos manufacturers, for example,
have unsuccessfully sued the United States Navy as employer of
shipyard personnel for failure to enforce safety regulations.265
Aside from state and federal workers' compensation acts and the
Federal Tort Claims Act,2 6 the Federal Employees Liability Act
(FELA)28 7 may provide a statutory basis for recovery for injuries
caused by toxic substances. 68 Suits against the United States
working at plant, and it was held that Workmen's Compensation Act was exclusive remedy,
absent showing of "deliberate intention [to cause injury] rather than gross negligence." But
see Mott v. Mitsubishi Int'l Corp., 636 F.2d 1073 (5th Cir. 1981) (dual capacity doctrine
rejected in Texas). See generally, Note, Dual Capacity Doctrine: Third-party Liability of
Employer-Manufacturer in Products Liability Litigation, 12 IND. L. REV. 553 (1979); Com-
ment, Manufacturer's Liability as a Dual Capacity of an Employer, 12 AKRON L. REv. 747
(1979).
262. No. 79-2116-7 (D.S.C. July 10, 1981).
263. Id.
264. See notes 116-20 supra and accompanying text. See generally, Weisgall, Product
Liability in the Workplace: The Effect of Workers' Compensation on the Rights and Lia-
bility of Third Parties, 1977 Wis. L. REV. 1035; Note, Workers' Compensation Insurance
Carrier as Third-party Tortfeasor, 25 WAYNE L. REV. 1165 (1979); Comment, A Critique of
the Justifications for Employee Suits in Strict Products Liability Against Third Party
Manufacturers, 25 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 125 (1977).
265. See Oman v. Johns-Manville Corp., 482 F. Supp. 1060 (E.D. Va. 1980).
266. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671-2680 (1976 & Supp. l 1979).
267. 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1976).
268. See, e.g., Best v. United States, 505 F. Supp. 48 (E.D.N.C. 1980).
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based upon state common law may be available against federal em-
ployees for their negligent acts not made within their discretionary
functions or duties. 69 Moreover, some states have passed statutes
granting a limited waiver of their eleventh amendment immunity
for the negligent acts of state employees. 270 Railroad employees
and persons covered by the Jones Act271 have a special compensa-
tion system under FELA272 that also provides for a common law
remedy. The standards of proof and defenses are generally more
favorable for the plaintiff than at common law in most states.73
Various other federal statutes may also provide a basis for plain-
tiffs to establish either standing or new causes of action. Although
these statutes have given governments authority and power to
bring suits in toxic substances cases when construed broadly, pri-
vate plaintiffs have not had substantial success under these stat-
utes in the absence of specific statutory provisions authorizing
such suits.2 7 4 In Yates v. Island Creek Coal Co.,27 5 for example,
plaintiffs unsuccessfully sought a private cause of action under the
Rivers and Harbors Appropriation Act and the Surface Mining
Control and Reclamation Act. And, in Langdon and Alpha Busi-
ness Services, Inc. v. Hunt, 76 suit was brought by private parties
under a host of theories including the citizens' suit provisions of
various federal acts and North Carolina statutes in an attempt to
recover monetary damages and to force federal and state govern-
ments to clean toxic waste from roadsides. Plaintiffs have also
sought recovery against governments and government employees
under the Civil Rights Acts.27
Plaintiffs have used state and federal constitutional provisions to
buttress their lawsuits. Although a few states have specific consti-
tutional provisions that require a commitment to the maintenance
of public resources, the federal constitution and most state consti-
269. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (1965).
270. See, e.g., MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 5-306 (Repl. Vol. 1980); N.C. GEN.
STAT. §§ 153A-435 (Repl. Vol. 1978) & 160A-485 (Repl. Vol. 1976); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 8.01-
195.1 to 8.01-195.8 (Cum. Supp. 1981).
271. 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1920).
272. 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1976).
273. See Rogers v. Missouri Pac. R. Co., 352 U.S. 500, reh. denied, 353 U.S. 943 (1957).
274. See generally McCastle v. Rollins Environmental Servs., 514 F. Supp. 936 (M.D. La.
1981).
275. 485 F. Supp. 995 (W.D. Va. 1980).
276. No. 80-487-CIV-5 (E.D.N.C. 1980).
277. See Marrapese v. Rhode Island, 500 F. Supp. 1207 (D.R.I. 1980).
1982]
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
tutions do not. 7 Attempts to develop either standing or private
causes of actions with the fifth, ninth and fourteenth amendments
have not met with great success.279 The theory of inverse condem-
nation, based upon an unconstitutional taking of property, has
been the most useful constitutional theory.2 80 The bulk of per-
sonal injury cases, however, do not usually lend themselves to this
approach because of a lack of accompanying damage to property.
VII. DEFENSES
The range of legal defenses is as broad as the underlying theories
of recovery and the practical defenses are even broader.281 During
the trial of a case defendants may argue that the plaintiff is not
injured; that the plaintiff is responsible for his own damages; that
the plaintiff has not proved all the elements of his case; that a
third party is responsible for causing the plaintiff's injuries; that a
third party could have avoided plaintiff's injuries; and that the de-
fendant's conduct and products were reasonable.2 82 These objec-
tives translate into a variety of defensive strategies including fac-
tual, technical, legal, obfuscation and "eyes of the manufacturer"
defenses.2
83
In tort actions defendants have relied upon the affirmative de-
fenses of contributory and comparative negligence, assumption of
the risk and statute of limitations.2 8 Legislation in a number of
278. See, e.g., VA. CONST. art. XI, §§ 1-3.
279. See, e.g., Ely v. Velde, 451 F.2d 1130, 1139 (4th Cir. 1971); Federal Employees for
Non-Smokers' Rights v. United States, 446 F. Supp. 181, 183-85 (D.D.C. 1978), aff'd, 598
F.2d 310 (D.C. Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 926 (1979).
280. See City of Charlotte v. Spratt, 263 N.C. 656, 140 S.E.2d 341 (1965); Ancarrow v.
City of Richmond, 600 F.2d 443 (4th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 992 (1979).
281. See generally Buchanan, Product Liability Defenses Under the Model Uniform
Product Liability Act and State Legislation, 15 FORUM 813 (1980); Carpenter, Products
Liability - An Analysis of the Law Governing Design and Warning Defects in Workplace
Products, 33 S.C. L. REv. 273 (1981); Keeton, Products Liability and Defenses: Intervening
Misconduct, 15 FORUM 109 (1979); Sales, Assumption of the Risk and Misuse in Strict Tort
Liability: Prelude to Comparative Fault, 11 TEx. TECH. L. REv. 729 (1980); Vargo, Some-
thing New and Something Old: Defenses to Strict Liability, 15 TRIAL 48 (1979).
282. S. BALDWIN, F. HARE & F. McGOVERN, THE PREPARATION OF A PRODucT LIABILITY
CASE 443-58 (1981).
283. Id. at 459-71.
284. See Schnurman v. United States, 490 F. Supp. 429 (E.D. Va. 1980) (statute of limita-
tion), Moran v. Faberge, Inc., 273 Md. 538, 332 A.2d 11 (1975) (contributory negligence);
Locke v. Johns-Manville Corp., 221 Va. 951, 275 S.E.2d 900 (1981) (statute of limitation);
Bradley v. Appalachian Power Co., 197 W. Va. 872, 256 S.E.2d 879 (1979) (comparative
negligence); Morningstar v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., - W. Va. -, 253 S.E.2d 666
(1979) (assumption of risk).
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states provides for additional defenses in product liability cases,
such as alteration, modification and misuse; state of the art; com-
pliance with government standards; and statutes of repose.8 5
Other defensive measures -have included allergic or abreactions, in-
tervening warnings or other intervening conduct, unintended use
and substantial change. 88
In contract actions defendants often have defenses of privity,
notice, disclaimers and occasionally assumption of the risk, con-
tributory negligence and misuse.87 For land based actions there
may be defenses involving prescriptive rights, assumption of the
risk, compliance with governmental standards, unusual sensitivity,
various forms of estoppel, and contractual or governmental
authorization. s8
There are additional potential defenses when a governmental en-
tity is a defendant. The Federal Tort Claims Act does not allow
recovery when there is either due care or discretionary function
exercised by a federal employee.289 In addition, a plaintiff must
often meet the procedural requirements of exhaustion of adminis-
trative processes 290 and overcome all the state common law de-
fenses otherwise available. If the Federal Employees Compensation
Act is applicable, then the exclusive remedy provisions also
285. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 99B-1 to 99B-4 (Repl. Vol. 1979), See also notes 296-
307 infra and accompanying text.
286. See Gardner v. Q.H.S. Inc., 448 F.2d 238 (4th Cir. 1971) (misuse); Gober v. Revlon,
Inc., 317 F.2d 47 (4th Cir. 1963) (allergic reaction); Spruill v. Boyle-Midway, Inc., 308 F.2d
79 (4th Cir. 1962) (unintended use). See also Comment, Substantial Change: Alteration of
a Product as a Bar to a Manufacturer's Strict Liability, 80 DIcK. L. REV. 245 (1976).
287. See notes 201-02 supra. See also Herman v. Smith, Kline & French Labs., 286 F.
Supp. 694 (E.D. Wisc. 1968) (notice); Bennett v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 231 F. Supp. 150
(E.D. IMI. 1964) (privity and notice).
288. See Moy v. Bell, 46 Md. App. 364, 416 A.2d 289 (1980) (need to timely commence
proceedings against a private nuisance); Liller v. State Highway Administration, 25 Md.
App. 276, 333 A.2d 644 (1975) (laches is not a defense to the enjoining of a public nuisance);
Hooks v. International Speedways, Inc., 263 N.C. 686, 140 S.E.2d 387 (1965) (inconvenience
to ordinary, normal and reasonable persons); Blue Ridge Poultry & Egg Co. v. Clark, 211
Va. 139, 176 S.E.2d 323 (1970) (estoppel due to acquiescence to defendant's conduct). The
defense most frequently raised is that the economic interests of the defendant, and of the
general public, outweigh the harm inflicted upon the plaintiff. See cases cited in note 215
supra.
289. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (1965).
290. See Deering & Milliken, Inc. v. Johnston, 295 F.2d 856 (4th Cir. 1961). But see
Porter County Chapter of Izaak Walton League of Am. v. Costle, 571 F.2d 359 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 439 U.S. 834 (1978) (administrative remedy does not have to be exhausted if to
exercise it would be futile).
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apply. 291
The following four general defensive areas can be used to com-
bat a number of theories of recovery by rebutting an element of a
plaintiff's case or establishing an affirmative defense. The first area
involves a "government contractor's" defense. If a defendant is
operating under contract to the federal government and damages
incurred by a plaintiff are sustained in connection with that opera-
tion, a defendant may have a government contractor's defense rec-
ognized in some courts. Under this defense a defendant may take
advantage of the government's sovereign immunity and exclusive
remedy protection from suits stemming from a third party's dam-
ages.29 2 A defendant must show, however, that its activities were
controlled and dictated by the United States government. Presum-
ably for this reason, the court in the Agent Orange litigation sug-
gested that there should be a trial on the government contractor's
defense issue before adjudication of the liability and damage
issues.293
The "state of the art" defense is one of the most misunderstood
defensive concepts in product liability cases.2 4 This misunder-
standing has been created by both its definition and its role in law-
suits. Plaintiffs tend to view the most recent theoretical technical
advances as part of the state of the art, whereas, defendants typi-
cally refer to proven technology in actual commercial use as
such.295 This difference of perspective creates confusion, as might
be anticipated. In the absence of legislation, there is no specific
affirmative defense of state of the art or compliance with either
governmental or industry standards. 96 State of the art issues are
291. See 45 U.S.C. § 51 (1976) and 5 U.S.C. § 8116 (1966) respectively.
292. See Schrader v. Hercules, Inc., 489 F. Supp. 159, 161 (W.D. Va. 1980).
293. 506 F. Supp. 762, 792-95 (E.D.N.Y.), rev'd, 635 F.2d 987 (2d Cir. 1980), review de-
nied, 50 U.S.L.W. 3483 (U.S. Dec. 15, 1981) (No. 80-1882).
294. See Susquehanna Valley Alliance v. Three Mile Island, 485 F. Supp. 81 (M.D. Pa.
1979), aff'd in part & otherwise rev'd, 619 F.2d 231 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S.
1096 (1981). But see Porter County Chapter of Izaak Walton League of Am. v. Costle, 571
F.2d 359 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 834 (1978).
295. See generally Raleigh, "The State of the Art" in Product Liability: A New Look at
an Old Defense, 4 OHIo N.L. REV. 249 (1977).
296. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-683(1) (Supp. 1980); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 34-
2804(a) (CuM. Supp. 1981); COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-403 (Cum. Supp. 1980); IDAHO CODE §
6-1406 (Cum. Supp. 1981); IND. CODE ANN. § 33-1-1.5-4(4) (Burns) (Cure. Supp. 1981); NEB.
REV. STAT. § 25-21,182 (1979); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 507 -D:4 (Cum. Supp. 1979); N.D.
CENT. CODE § 28.01.1-05(4) (Interim Supp. 1979); TENN. CODE ANN. § 23-3704-5 (Repl. VoL
1980); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-15-6(3) (Repl. Vol. 9A 1977). See also Walker v. Trico Mfg.
Co., 487 F.2d 595 (7th Cir.) (under Illinois law, there is no "state of the art" defense in a
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generally raised when there are toxic substance effects which a de-
fendant has not anticipated. Evidence of the unknown characteris-
tics of a product can be used to establish that there was no negli-
gence, that the product was not defective or that the product was
unavoidably unsafe.2 97
One potentially fruitful defensive measure may arise if there are
changes that occur to a substance after it enters the stream of
commerce but before it causes any harmful effects. 98 Although
most product liability actions do not involve fact patterns in which
there is a substantial change in a product between the time of
manufacture and the time it reaches the hands of the consumer,
toxic substances may undergo chemical or physical alteration that
will enable a defendant to negate an element of the plaintiff's case.
Alteration, modification and misuse of a substance after it enters
the stream of commerce may also give defendants an opportunity
to avoid liability.29
One of the most popular defensive postures is to emphasize the
role of other parties in causing an alleged harm. If it can be estab-
lished that another entity is responsible for an intervening and su-
perseding cause, the defendant can avoid liability.300 Many defen-
dants attempt to shift liability to employers who are in a superior
position to eliminate a potential harm, to health care providers
who could warn or otherwise reduce the chances of harm and to
sophisticated plaintiffs who should have been able to cope with the
dangers inherent in a potentially dangerous substance.30 1
VIII. CAUSATION
Toxic substances cases raise fundamental questions concerning
the adaptability of our common law to all types of evolving fact
strict products liability action), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 978 (1973).
297. See Chambers v. G.D. Searle & Co., 441 F. Supp. 377 (D. Md. 1975), aff'd, 567 F.2d
269 (4th Cir. 1977). See also Comment, The State of the Art Defense in Products Liability:
"Unreasonably Dangerous" to the Injured Consumer, 18 DuQ. L. REV. 915, 927-31 (1980).
298. See Smith v. Fiber Controls Corp., 44 N.C. App. 422, 261 S.E. 2d 247, aff'd, 300 N.C.
669, 268 S.E.2d 504 (1980). See also Comment, Substantial Change: Alteration of a Product
as a Bar to Manufacturer's Strict Liability, 80 DiCK. L. REv. 245 (1976).
299. See Salmon v. Parke, Davis & Co., 520 F.2d 1359 (4th Cir. 1975).
300. For example, a distributor who is aware of a manufacturer's warning would be in a
better position to advise users as to dangers of using a product in specific conditions than
the manufacturer. See Wilson v. E-Z Flo Chem. Co., 281 N.C. 506, 189 S.E. 2d 221 (1972).
301. See Levin v. Walter Kidde & Co., 251 Md. 560, 248 A.2d 151 (1968); Jenkins v.
Helgren, 26 N.C. App. 653, 217 S.E.2d 120 (1975).
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situations.30 2 Nowhere is this more evident than with the issue of
causation. Although there is a rich legal literature concerning cau-
sation,30 3 there is much confusion concerning the theoretical and
philosophical underpinnings and assumptions of its various con-
cepts.80 4 This confusion, which is not unique to the legal profes-
sion, becomes apparent when comparing interdisciplinary concepts
of causation. Some scientists and medical doctors, for example,
seem to have a different understanding of the word "cause". While
an epidemiologist may identify a causal relationship between two
factors if there is a mere "association", 05 a physician on the other
hand may not testify concerning "probable" cause unless there is
virtual certainty.306
These philosophical differences compound the practical
problems inherent in handling causation problems in toxic sub-
stances cases. A plaintiff may be faced with a situation involving
joint, seriatim or concurrent causation.307 There may be difficulties
in proving a causal relationship between a particular defendant
and a particular product,308 or the causal relationship between a
defendant's product and an injury suffered may be confused by the
fact that a number of other products combined to cause a plain-
tiff's particular harm.309 Moreover, a specific defendant's product
may cause only a percentage of or may merely aggravate a plain-
tiff's harm.3 10
302. See generally, STASON, EsTEP & PIERCE, ATOMS AND THE LAW (1959).
303. See generally, Henderson, Medical Causation in Products Liability Disease Litiga-
tion, 17 TRIAL 53 (1981); Hubbard, Efficiency, Expectation, and Justice: A Jurisprudential
Analysis of the Concept of Unreasonably Dangerous Product Defect, 28 S.C.L. REv. 587
(1977); McAteer, Accidents: Causation and Responsibility in Law, A Focus on Coal Mining,
83 W. VA. L. REv. (1981); Philo & Steinberg, Proving Causation in Products Liability
Cases, 16 TRIAL 28 (1980); Note, Market Share Liability: A New Method of Recovery for
D.E.S. Litigants, 30 CATH. U.L. REv. 551 (1981).
304. L. Green, The Causal Relation Issue in Negligence Law, in THE LITIGATION PROCESS
IN TORT LAW, 249 (2d ed. 1977); L. Green, Duties, Risks, Causation Doctrine, in THE Lm-
GATION PROCESS IN TORT LAW 215 (2d ed. 1977).
305. See generally, Levine, Legal Questions Regarding the Causation of Occupational
Disease, 26 LAB. L.J. 88, 89-90 (1975).
306. See Brochu v. Ortho Pharmacetical Corp., 642 F.2d 652, 660 (1st Cir. 1981). See also
Danner & Sagall, Medicolegal Causation: A Source of Professional Misunderstanding, 3
AM. J.L. & MED. 303, 304 (1978).
307. See, e.g., Stanback v. Parke, Davis & Co., 502 F. Supp. 767, 771 (W.D. Va. 1980);
Mehlman v. Powell, 281 Md. 269, 378 A.2d 1121 (1977); Coleman v. Blankenship Oil Corp.,
221 Va. 124, 267 S.E.2d 143 (1980); Long v. City of Weirton, 214 S.E.2d 832 (W. Va. 1975).
308. See Ryan v. Eli Lilly & Co., 514 F. Supp. 1004 (D.S.C. 1981).
309. For example, is a textile worker's breathing difficulties the result of heavy cigarette
smoking or of exposure to cotton dust?
310. Estep, Radiation Injuries and Statistics, 59 MICH. L. REv. 259, 263-64 (1960).
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One of the threshold issues concerning causation is the distinc-
tion between cause-in-fact (actual cause) and proximate cause (le-
gal cause).,1 1 In general terms, the crucial distinction is that proxi-
mate cause involves a policy decision and thus includes an element
of foreseeability. 12 This presents a problem in strict liability in
tort cases because most strict liability theories suggest that scien-
ter, and hence foreseeability, is banished from the cause of ac-
tion. 31 3 However, if causation is an element of the plaintiff's case,
there remains the necessity of proving foreseeability. Some courts
have recognized this problem and have reacted by requiring the
plaintiff to prove only actual cause or by admitting that strict lia-
bility in tort is not completely strict.3 1 4
One of the most difficult problems associated with causation in-
volves the quantum of proof necessary to raise a fact issue for a
plaintiff.3 15 Must the plaintiff prove probable cause or possible
cause? Can the evidence be probabilistic, or must it be particular-
istic in nature? Although some plaintiffs' attorneys have suggested
the contrary, most states require some specific words concerning
causation to raise a fact issue - probable cause, reasonable medi-
cal certainty, substantial factor or the equivalent.316 Whether the
sufficiency of evidence must be based upon direct evidence of the
plaintiff's specific case is the subject of substantial debate.31 7 De-
311. "[B]efore a proximate cause issue can arise, the court must receive evidence of the
defendant's carelessness, the plaintiff's injury, and a factual cause and effect relationship
between the two." Seidelson, Some Reflections on Proximate Cause, 19 DUQ. L. REv. 1, 3
(1980). See generally W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS § 41 (4th ed. 1971).
312. Given the defendant's culpability, the issue becomes whether or not to assess liabil-
ity. Seidelson, supra note 312, at 3. "Proximate cause analysis, which involves policy consid-
erations of remoteness and limitation of liability, need only be considered after cause-in-fact
has been established." Harrison v. Flota Mercante Grancolombiana, S.A., 577 F.2d 968, 983
(5th Cir. 1978). As to the issue of foreseeability in cases not dealing with toxic substances,
see Goode v. Harrison, 45 N.C. App. 547, 263 S.E.2d 33 (1980).
313. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
314. C.A. Hoover & Son v. O.M. Franklin Serum Co., 444 S.W.2d 596 (Tex. 1969).
315. "Proximate cause in the law is not necessarily the proximate cause of the logician,
but is determined upon mixed considerations of logic, common sense and experience, policy
and precedent." Gonzalez v. Virginia-Carolina Chem. Co., 239 F. Supp. 567, 573 (E.D.S.C.
1965).
316. See United States v. Standard Oil Co., 495 F.2d 911, 916 (9th Cir. 1974). "When
direct proof of causation is lacking, 'the causal connection can be shown by facts and cir-
cumstances which, in the light of ordinary experience, reasonably suggests that the [defen-
dant's] negligence in the manner charged operated proximately to produce the injury.'" Id.
at 916 (quoting Johnson v. Griffiths S.S. Co., 150 F.2d 224, 226 (9th Cir. 1945)). See also In
re Swine Flu Immunization Prods. Liab. Litig., 495 F. Supp. 1188, 1206 (D. Colo. 1980).
317. See Melville v. American Home Assur. Co., 443 F. Supp. 1064 (D. Pa.), rev'd, 584
F.2d 1306 (3d Cir. 1977). "It is also important to note that a longitudinal study yields infor-
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fendants argue that negligence cannot be presumed from the mere
happening of an accident, 8 ' that they have due process rights and
that they should be protected against fraudulent claims.3 19 From
the defendant's point of view a plaintiff's expert may testify that
there is a fifty-one percent chance that someone who is exposed to
a certain toxic substance will contract a particular disease. If plain-
tiffs are allowed to recover without having to present direct evi-
dence, all a plaintiff needs to do is prove that he has the disease
and was exposed to the substance in a sufficient quantity to cause
the disease. Although there is no direct evidence whatsoever that
the specific toxic substance caused the injury and that in forty-
nine percent of the cases his actions were not the cause of any in-
jury, the defendant will have to pay damages. 20 On the other
hand, the problem of medical uncertainty often makes it inpossi-
ble for the plaintiff to prove a causal relationship between the in-
jury and the toxic substance in any manner other than by the use
of this type of circumstantial evidence. 21
Defendants often seek to avoid liability by asserting that some
third party's action constituted an intervening or superseding
cause thereby breaking the causative link.3 22 Courts have taken dif-
ferent approaches to handling these close questions of concurrent
and intervening cause. Some courts can resolve the issue as a mat-
ter of law, but, typically a jury is asked to make a decision based
upon extremely complex legal and factual information.
IX. DAMAGES
Plaintiffs who seek redress for harm caused by toxic substances
may obtain monetary or non-monetary relief, or a combination of
mation concerning probabilities of causal connection in a population, but the legal problem
always is to determine whether a causal relationship is provable in each individual case."
Levine, supra note 305, at 90 (emphasis in original).
318. See Whitehurst v. Revlon, Inc., 307 F. Supp. 918 (E.D. Va. 1969). But see Santoni v.
Schaerf, 48 Md. App. 498, 428 A.2d 94 (1981) (evidence of 12 cases of hepatitis by users of
isoniazid admissible to show causation).
319. See Estep, supra note 310, at 262-63; Gelpe & Tarlock, The Uses of Scientific Infor-
mation in Environmental Decisionmaking, 48 S. CAL. L. REV. 371, 373 (1974).
320. For a discussion of this problem in the context of leukemia and radiation exposure,
see Estep, supra note 310, at 268-98.
321. See Heyman v. United States, 506 F. Supp. 1145 (S.D. Fla. 1981); Hixenbaugh v.
United States, 506 F. Supp. 461 (N.D. Ohio 1980).
322. Spruill v. Boyle-Midway, Inc., 308 F.2d 79 (4th Cir. 1962); Stanback v. Parke, Davis
& Co., 502 F. Supp. 767 (W.D. Va. 1980).
290 [Vol. 16:247
TOXIC SUBSTANCES LITIGATION
both, from courts or administrative agencies. 23 Monetary relief is
awarded for various kinds of injuries including: actual past or fu-
ture damages to property; interference with the use or enjoyment
of property; discomfort, annoyance or inconvenience; past or future
medical expenses; past or future pain and suffering; past or future
lost wages; past or future personal expenses; past or future busi-
ness expenses; past or future lost profits; other past or future eco-
nomic loss; mental anguish; loss of consortium; prejudgment inter-
est; and attorney's fees. 24 Depending on the legal theory plead, a
plaintiff may be entitled to nominal damages when the actual loss
cannot be substantiated.3 25
Because monetary damages are not always possible, abatement,
temporary or permanent injunctive relief, and mandamus might be
sought. These remedies may be especially useful in preventing an
anticipated harm.2 6 Because they are equitable in nature, a court
will weigh the comparative interests of the parties, as well as the
interests of the public. In order to obtain an injunction, it may be
necessary in some circumstances for a party to agree to indemnifi-
cation for damages if the subsequent judgment is in favor of the
defendant. 27
The awarding and prescribing of the amount of monetary dam-
ages recoverable typically remain within the province of the finder
323. For the issue of damages, see Fulton, Punitive Damages in Product Liability Cases,
15 FoRum 117 (1979); Owen, Punitive Damages in Products Liability Litigation, 74 Micn.
L. REV. 1258 (1976); Pfennigstorf, Environment, Damages, and Compensation, 1979 AM.
BAR FOUNDATION RES. J. 347; Commexit, Implied Preemption of Punitive Damages for Nu-
clear Accidents, 29 AM. U. L. REv. 741 (1980).
324. See notes 143-230, 231-84 supra and accompanying text. For cases regarding mone-
tary relief in non-toxic substances litigation, see Ponder v. Budweiser of Asheville, Inc., 30
N.C. App. 200, 226 S.E.2d 539 (loss of profit sought), review denied, 291 N.C. 176, 229
S.E.2d 690 (1976); Gray v. Southern Facilities, Inc., 256 S.C. 558, 183 S.E.2d 438 (1971)
(discomfort, illness, or inconvenience); Jarrett v. E.L. Harper & Son, Inc., 235 S.E.2d 362
(W. Va. 1977) (annoyance and inconvenience). Attorney fees are not awarded absent statu-
tory requirement, contractual arrangement, special circumstances, or applicability of a rule.
See Archway Motors, Inc. v. Herman, 41 Md. App. 40, 394 A.2d 1228 (1979); Rimmer v.
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 248 S.C. 18, 148 S.E.2d 742 (1966); Hiss v. Friedberg, 201
Va. 572, 112 S.E.2d 871 (1960).
325. A violation of a legal right may be created either by law, Brett v. Georgia-Pacific
Corp., 46 N.C. App. 107, 264 S.E.2d 395 (1980) (trespass), or by contract, Hooton v. Ken-
neth B. Mumaw Plumbing & Heating Co., 271 Md. 565, 318 A.2d 514 (1974).
326. See Anne Arundel County v. Governor, 45 Md. App. 435, 413 A.2d 281 (1980).
327. See S.C. CODE § 15-55-60 (1977). See also Note, Emotional Distress in Products
Liability: Distinguishing Users from Bystanders, 50 FORDHAM L. REv. 291 (1981); Com-
ment, Punitive Damages Awards in Strict Pioducts Liability Litigation: The Doctrine, the
Debate, the Defense, 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 771 (1981).
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of fact except awards given under some statutory systems or a
court's remittitur power. 28 Though the injured party bears the
burden of proving his damages, absolute certainty is not required.
The jury's determination, however, should not be based on mere
speculation.3 29 A major potential difficulty in these types of cases is
that a large number of people who may be exposed to various toxic
substances could be aware of their exposure and the potential for
future personal injury or disease, but may have no immediately
diagnosable physical harm. These individuals have been termed
"at risk" or "pre-cancerous. ' 3 s0 In states with a statute of limita-
tion that commences at the time of exposure or a statute of repose
that limits the time for bringing actions, these persons must file
suit immediately or, in effect, waive their right to recover. The
traditional basis for such a statute has been that the calculation of
damages for being "at risk" is purely speculative and thus not re-
coverable.331 Recent diagnostic techniques, like those for ascer-
taining chromosomal damage, could create a factual basis for sup-
porting immediate suits.3 3 2 Otherwise, if there is no immediately
ascertainable damage, a plaintiff must seek to recover on some al-
ternative basis. There may be recovery for mental anguish, if the
defendant's conduct has been intentional or outrageous,33 but,
generally, such recovery is only available if the mental anguish ac-
companies actual injury or at least the immediate potential for
some actual injury.3 3 4
328. See Wedeman v. City Chevrolet Co., 278 Md. 524, 366 A.2d 7 (1976); Oestreicher v.
American Nat'l Stores, Inc., 290 N.C. 118, 225 S.E.2d 797 (1976); Worrie v. Boze, 198 Va.
533, 95 S.E.2d 192 (1956), afl'd, 198 Va. 891, 96 S.E.2d 799 (1957); Raines v. Faulkner, 131
W. Va. 10, 48 S.E.2d 393 (1947).
329. "The law does not favor recoveries premised upon conjecture." Heinzman v. Fine,
Fine, Legum & Fine, 217 Va. 958, 964, 234 S.E.2d 282, 286 (1977). See also Smith v. Pittston
Co., 203 Va. 711, 127 S.E.2d 79 (1962) (apportioning damages among multiple pollutors).
330. See Ryan v. Eli Lilly & Co., 514 F. Supp. 1004 (D.S.C. 1981); Langdon & Alpha
Business Servs., Inc. v. Hunt, No. 80-487-CIV-5 (E.D.N.C. 1980).
331. "[A]ny future complications from a malady which are not probable become a risk
which the injured person must bear because the law cannot achieve justice if speculation is
to be used as the basis for determining damages." Davidson v. Miller, 276 Md. 54, _ 344
A.2d 422, 427 (1975). Courts may adhere to the notion "[t]hat there can be no recovery...
before [the damages] occur." Midgett v. North Carolina Hwy. Comm'n, 265 N.C. 373, -,
144 S.E.2d 121, 124 (1965).
332. BRowN, LAYING WASTE 77-85 (1981).
333. See, e.g., Harris v. Jones, 281 Md. 560, 380 A.2d 611 (1977); Dickens v. Puryear, 302
N.C. 437, 276 S.E.2d 325 (1981); Hudson v. Zenith Engraving Co., 273 S.C. 766, 259 S.E.2d
812 (1979); Hughes v. Moore, 214 Va. 27, 197 S.E.2d 214 (1973).
334. See H & R Block, Inc. v. Testerman, 275 Md. 36, -, 338 A.2d 48, 55 (1975)
(avoidance of feigned claims). See also McDowell v. Davis, 33 N.C. App. 529, -, 235
S.E.2d 896, 901, review denied, 293 N.C. 360, 237 S.E.2d 848 (1977). Contra, Womack v.
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As with the "at risk" plaintiffs, parents may find that their chil-
dren or grandchildren may suffer injury caused by their exposure
to a toxic substance. Because of such mutagenic effects, there have
been suits filed for preconception and prenatal injuries. Aside
from the problem of measuring the dollar amount of damages,
3 5
identifying defendants and establishing causation can present sub-
stantial difficulties for a plaintiff seeking to recover under these
circumstances. 3 6 There may also be toxic substances suits brought
because of the birth of an unwanted child, the so-called "wrongful
birth" or "wrongful life" actions, that raise a number of similar
issues.337
In other situations where there is no personal injury or property
damage or where suit is brought under a theory of strict liability in
tort, plaintiffs may have difficulty in recovering economic losses.
Although, in appropriate circumstances, economic losses are poten-
tially recoverable as special or compensatory damages, 38 most
states do not allow recovery for economic loss in the absence of
some other type of damage. Under a theory of strict liability in
tort, a plaintiff may recover for all losses incurred for physical
harm to person or property. If, however, a defective product does
not function properly because of mere deterioration, loss of eco-
nomic opportunities resulting from the defect may not be
compensable. 39
Statutory provisions may aid in obtaining compensation for
harm caused by pollution because, in addition to creating stan-
dards of care, they may provide for damage awards. For example,
North Carolina's Sedimentation Pollution Control Act of 1973340
provides for double damages in civil actions where the actual loss
is less than $500.00 as well as for the assessment of attorney's fees
Eldridge, 215 Va. 338, 340, 210 S.E.2d 145, 147 (1974).
335. For a review of the various rationales used in wrongful life cases, see Phillips v.
United States, 508 F. Supp. 537, 542-43 (D.S.C. 1980).
336. See notes 307-11 supra and accompanying text.
337. See Phillips v. United States, 508 F. Supp. 544 (D.S.C. 1981) (parent's action for
"wrongful birth"); Phillips v. United States, 508 F. Supp. 537 (D.S.C. 1980) (child's action
for "wrongful life"). For a general discussion of both theories, see Kelly, Wrongful Life,
Wrongful Birth and Justice in Tort Law, 1979 WASH. U.L.Q. 919; Trotzig, The Defective
Child and the Actions for Wrongful Life and Wrongful Birth, 14 FAM. L.Q. 15 (1980).
338. See Ponder v. Budweiser of Asheville, Inc., 30 N.C. App. 200, 226 S.E.2d 539, review
denied, 291 N.C. 176, 229 S.E.2d 690 (1976).
339. See States S.S. Co. v. Stone Manganese Marine, Ltd., 371 F. Supp. 500, 504-05
(D.N.J. 1973).
340. N.C. GE.N. STAT. § 113A-66 (Repl. Vol. 1978).
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and investigating costs against a losing defendant.
Most plaintiffs seek to add a claim for exemplary or punitive
damages whenever possible." 1 The standards of proof required to
support punitive damages vary from state to state, but, generally,
the defendant's conduct must be either grossly negligent, willful,
wanton, or intentional. 42 Exemplary damages may not be available
in actions based solely upon breach of contract or strict liability in
tort.343 As a rule, there must be at least nominal compensatory
damages before any punitive damages can be awarded. 44 While
there is no set rule concerning the relationship between the
amount of compensatory and punitive damages, some positive cor-
relation should exist, and courts have not been reluctant to grant
remittitur where punitive damages were deemed excessive. 45 One
of.the major difficulties for courts in awarding punitive damages is
in reconciling the limited resources of most defendants with the
potentially unlimited number of plaintiffs who may deserve recov-
ery. 46 Suggestions have been made that a trust fund or other type
of collective system be developed to accommodate this situation. 47
341. "Ordinarily punitive damages are not recoverable .... In the proper case, however,
punitive damages are permitted on public policy grounds." Terry v. Terry, - N.C. -, -,
273 S.E.2d 674, 680 (1981). Punitive damages may be a good deterrent because a person
might reconsider his actions if he could be liable for more than just actual losses. See
Wedeman v. City Chevrolet Co., 278 Md. 524, -, 366 A.2d 7, 12 (1976) (fraud action). See
also Cheek v. J.B.G. Properties, Inc., 28 Md. App. 29, 344 A.2d 180 (1975); F.B.C. Stores,
Inc. v. Duncan, 214 Va. 246, 198 S.E.2d 595 (1973).
342. See H & R Block, Inc. v. Testerman, 275 Md. 36, 338 A.2d 48 (1975); Oestreicher v.
American Nat'l Stores, Inc., 290 N.C. 118, 225 S.E.2d 797 (1976); Robinson v. Duszynski, 36
N.C. App. 103, 243 S.E.2d 148 (1978); Harris v. Burnside, 261 S.C. 190, 199 S.E.2d 65 (1973);
Giant of Va., Inc. v. Pigg, 207 Va. 679, 152 S.E.2d 271 (1967).
343. See Wedeman v. City Chevrolet, Co., 278 Md. 524, 366 A.2d 7 (1976) (breach of
contract); Sims v. Ryland Group, Inc., 37 Md. App. 470, 378 A.2d 1 (1977) (breach of con-
tract and warranty); Pinckney v. Orkin Exterminating Co., 268 S.C. 430, 234 S.E.2d 654
(1977) (breach of contract, fraud and deceit). But see American Laundry Mach. v. Horan, 45
Md. App. 97, 412 A.2d 407 (1980) (punitive damages in product liability action based on
manufacturer's conduct).
344. See Shell Oil Co. v. Parker, 265 Md. 631, 291 A.2d 64 (1972); Phillips v. Universal
Underwriters Ins. Co., 43 N.C. App. 56, 257 S.E.2d 671 (1979); Carroway v. Johnson, 245
S.C. 200, 139 S.E.2d 908 (1965); O'Brien v. Snow, 215 Va. 403, 210 S.E.2d 165 (1974); Raines
v. Faulkner, 131 W. Va. 10, 48 S.E.2d 393 (1947).
345. See Spencer v. Steinbrecher, 152 W. Va. 490, 164 S.E.2d 710 (1968).
346. See Roginsky v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 378 F.2d 832 (2d Cir. 1967). Courts have
noted that consideration must be given to a defendant's ability to pay. See, e.g., United
States v. Snepp, 595 F.2d 926 (4th Cir. 1979), rev'd, 444 U.S. 507, rehearing denied, 445
U.S. 507 (1980); Reid v. Kelly, 274 S.C. 171, 262 S.E.2d 24 (1980).
347. See Owen, supra note 323, at 1322-25. One criticism of using a tort-based system of
compensation is that the plaintiff's recovery is delayed while issues of causation and fault
are decided. Note, The End of A Faulted System: New Zealand Adopts a No-Fault Ap-
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X. EVIDENTIARY ISSUES
One of the least examined, yet most important, areas of legal
issues in toxic substances litigation involves a myriad of eviden-
tiary problems348 including the following: government generated in-
formation; activities or events subsequent to the entry of a toxic
substance into the stream of commerce; evidence relating to ele-
ments of theories of recovery or defenses; documents, articles and
tests; and expert witnesses. The complexity of these issues is com-
pounded by the temporal relationship between the evidence and
the various elements of a plaintiff's theory of recovery. 49 Design
changes, for example, may or may not be admissible depending
upon when they occurred and what theory of liability is being
asserted.350
Government generated information may take the form of stat-
utes, regulations, rulings, guidelines, investigations, hearings, mem-
oranda, reports, tests and many other documents. Some of this in-
formation is available through the Freedom of Information Act.3 5
1
Attorneys have also attempted to use a federal agency's subpoena
power to gather information helpful to their clients.3 52 Guidelines
for the availability and use of this potential evidence vary from
proach to Personal Injury Compensation, 1973 L. & Soc. ORDER 679, 690-91. A possible
solution has been to use a trust fund to pay the expenses of unique plaintiffs prior to trial.
See, e.g., Friends for All Children, Inc. v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 87 F.R.D. 560 (D.D.C.
1980).
348. See generally Sheldon, Circumstantial Proof in Products Liability Cases: A Danger-
ous Precedent, 30 FED'N INS. COUNS.L Q. 265 (1980); Stephens & Hollon, Closing the Evi-
dentiary Gap: A Review of Circuit Court Opinions Analyzing Federal Black Lung Pre-
sumptions of Entitlement, 83 W. VA. L. Rav. 793 (1981); Weber, Advancing Frontiers in
Products Liability Evidence, 29 FED'N INS. COUNSEL Q. 257 (1979); Note, Evidentiary Re-
quirements to Prove a Claim for Black Lung Benefits: Impact of the Black Lung Benefits
Reform Act of 1977, 82 W. VA. L. Rav. 1425 (1980); Comment, Federal Rule of Evidence 407
and Its State Variations: The Courts Perform Some "Subsequent Remedial Measures" of
Their Own in Products Liability Cases, 49 U.M.K.C. L. REv. 338 (1981); Comment, Expert
Medical Testimony: Differences Between the North Carolina Rules and Federal Rules of
Evidence, 12 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 833 (1976).
349. Henderson, Coping with the Time Dimension in Products Liability, 69 CALIF. L.
REv. 919 (1981).
350. See Werner v. Upjohn Co., 628 F.2d 848 (4th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 862
(1981); Tyson v. Long Mfg. Co., 249 N.C. 557, 107 S.E.2d 170 (1959); Turner v. Manning,
Maxwell & Moore, Inc., 216 Va. 245, 217 S.E.2d 863 (1975).
351. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1976). For cases involving the use of governmental material, see How-
ard v. McCrory Corp., 601 F.2d 133 (4th Cir. 1979); Gonzalez v. Virginia-Carolina Chem.
Co., 239 F. Supp. 567 (E.D.S.C. 1965); Jenkins v. Helgren, 26 N.C. App. 653, 217 S.E.2d 120
(1975); Beasley v. Kerr-McGee Chem. Corp., 273 S.C. 523, 257 S.E.2d 726 (1979); McClana-
han v. California Spray-Chem. Corp., 194 Va. 842, 75 S.E.2d 712 (1953).
352. See United States v. Allen, 494 F. Supp. 107 (W.D. Wis. 1980).
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agency to agency and state to state. Investigators of the National
Transportation Safety Board and the Federal Aviation Adminis-
tration are amenable to being deposed concerning their investiga-
tions of accidents but cannot be required to draw conclusions from
the facts they may find.353
There are any number of events that may occur subsequent to
the design, manufacture or sale of a product or injury to a plaintiff,
but prior to trial or appeal, which the defendant may wish to intro-
duce at trial. Such events include product recall, design change,
repairs, production change, warning change, instructions change,
industry custom change, scientific change, technological change, in-
dustry standards change, complaints or accidents, tests and experi-
ments, and statutory or regulatory change. 54 At the same time the
plaintiff may seek to introduce the absence of any of these events.
The use of strict liability in tort, with its unique elements and
more liberalized rules of procedure, has led to a considerable in-
crease in the admissibility of this type of evidence.3 55
As the difference among the elements of theories of recovery and
defenses change and multiply, the evidence that may be poten-
tially admissible increases proportionately.356 Evidence of due care
and state of the art is crucial to a negligence action, but it has been
argued that neither would be admissible under a strict liability in
tort theory.35 7 Evidence of the efficacy or lack of efficacy of a drug
may or may not be admissible depending upon the allegations of
defect.35
Experiments, studies, articles, documents and expert witnesses
353. 49 C.F.R. §§ 7 & 801 (1980).
354. See Werner v. Upjohn Co., 628 F.2d 848 (4th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 862
(1981); Stonehacker v. General Motors Corp., 587 F.2d 151 (4th Cir. 1978); Campus Sweater
& Sportswear Co. v. M.B. Kahn Constr. Co., 515 F. Supp. 64 (D.S.C. 1979); Jenkins v. Hel-
gren, 26 N.C. App. 653, 217 S.E.2d 120 (1975). See also S. BALDWIN, F. HARE & F. McGov-
ERN, supra note 282, at ch. 3.
355. "Emphasizing the trend away from negligence-based liability toward strict liability
in products cases, a growing number of judges and scholars have concluded that courts
should consider time-of-trial knowledge of product-related hazards, at least, in determining
the reasonableness of a manufacturer's earlier design and marketing decisions." Henderson,
supra note 349, at 919.
356. See Werner v. Upjohn Co., 628 F.2d 848 (4th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 862
(1981).
357. Walker v. Trico Mfg. Co., 487 F.2d 595, 600 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 978
(1973).
358. See Needham v. White Labs., Inc., 639 F.2d 394 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 50 U.S.L.W.
3276 (U.S. Oct. 13, 1981) (No. 81-191).
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have created substantial difficulties for the trial judge." 9 Animal
experiments concerning carcinogens have generally not been ad-
mitted into evidence to prove that a particular substance caused
cancer to a particular person.60 Although some attorneys have
been successful in introducing epidemiological and other statistical
studies into evidence, 6' they must, however, overcome arguments
suggesting that these studies are unreliable, irrelevant, unneces-
sary, hearsay and not subject to cross-examination. Articles writ-
ten concerning single cases of the potential effects of a toxic sub-
stance have run into the same objections. 62 If this literature is not
admissible, plaintiffs face extremely difficult problems establishing
a prima facie case unless they can depose the authors of the arti-
cles or have them testify personally. This has led to the use of na-
tional and multi-state depositions and other attempts to use the
same testimony in a large number of cases. 6 3 In many instances
the documents sought to be used are extremely old and cannot be
authenticated by normal means, thus raising objections of remote-
ness, hearsay, relevancy, and unfair prejudice.3 6 4
There is a trend for some attorneys to use expert witnesses who
have never seen the plaintiff, such as biostatisticians, epidemiolo-
gists, or physicians, to prove a causal relationship between a toxic
substance and the plaintiff's injuries.3 65 Their argument is that an
expert can testify concerning facts or data of a type reasonably re-
lied upon by experts in a particular field in forming opinions or
inferences and can thus meet the quantum of proof for establishing
causation. 6 Defendants have argued that this type of testimony is
inherently prejudicial because the defense cannot cross-examine
the witness upon the controls, assumptions, soft variables, validity
359. See, e.g, Howard v. McCrory Corp., 601 F.2d 133 (4th Cir. 1979); Spruill v. Boyle-
Midway, Inc., 308 F.2d 79 (4th Cir. 1962); Santoni v. Schaerf, 48 Md. 498, 428 A.2d 94
(1981); Beasley v. Kerr-McGee Chem. Corp., 273 S.C. 523, 257 S.E.2d 726 (1979); Brewer v.
Morris, 269 S.C. 607, 239 S.E.2d 318 (1977).
360. See Briggs v. Zotos Int'l., Inc., 357 F. Supp. 89 (E.D. Va. 1973).
361. See Needham v. White Labs., Inc., 639 F.2d 394 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 50 U.S.L.W.
3277 (U.S. Oct. 13, 1981) (No. 81-191).
362. Id.
363. See FED. R. Civ. P. 27 & 28, reprinted in FED. RULES DIGEST, Rules 27 & 28 (3d ed.
1977 & Supp. 1981).
364. See FED. R. EVID. 803. See also P. ROTHSTIEN, UNDERSTANDING THE NEW FEDERAL
RULES OF EVIDENCE 395 (Supp. 1975).
365. See Needham v. White Labs., Inc., 639 F.2d 394 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 50 U.S.L.W.
3276 (U.S. Oct. 13, 1981) (No. 81-191); Gober v. Revlon, Inc., 317 F.2d 47 (4th Cir. 1963).
366. See generally, R. Dickson, Medical Causation by Statistics (Aug. 1981) (paper
presented at 1981 Annual Meeting of the American Bar Ass'n.).
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and other factors inherent in the studies that form the basis of the
expert opinion. If the nonexamining expert is allowed to testify,
defendants argue that their testimony should be limited to only
the conclusions drawn in those studies. However, such an expert
witness should not be allowed to draw conclusions about the par-
ticular plaintiff because the witness had neither the ability nor the
opportunity to give the plaintiff a medical examination to establish
specific causation.3 6 7
XI. INSURANCE
There may be several primary and excess insurance policies that
cover damages awarded against manufacturers in toxic injury
cases-general comprehensive liability policies, product liability
policies and various special policies. Litigation is not uncommon in
interpreting both the language concerning coverage36 8 and specific
exclusions such as pollution and war risk.38 9 There are also cases
concerning mandatory deductibles, rights to settle, failure to settle,
policy limits, stacking, punitive damages, injunctive relief, and suc-
cessor corporations. 7 °
One of the most novel and important issues raised in the context
of toxic substances cases involves the allocation of responsibility
for insurance coverage among the various insurance companies who
may have issued many different policies over a number of years to
a chemical manufacturer whose products cause progressive or cu-
mulative injuries to claimants over a long period of time. In cases
367. Id. See also Nolan v. Dillon, 261 Md. 516, 276 A.2d 36 (1971).
368. Most general comprehensive liability policies contain a definition of "occurence"
such as "an accident, including continuous or repeated exposure to conditions, which results
in bodily injury or property damage neither expected nor intended from the standpoint of
the insured." See Transamerica Ins. Co. v. Bellefonte Ins. Co., 490 F. Supp. 935, 936 (E.D.
Pa. 1980). Insurance carriers for chemical companies that dump toxic waste may contend
that there is no insurance coverage because the property damage caused by the toxic waste
was both expected and intended.
369. See Hourihan, Insurance Coverage for Environmental Damage Claims, 15 FORUM
551, 563 (1980).
370. See id. at 556. See also Appel, Liability in Mass Immunization Programs, 1980
B.Y.U. L. REv. 69; King, Punitive Damages, 16 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 345 (1980); Pomer-
antz, Products Liability Insurance in the New Industrial Revolution, 1980 INs. L.J. 129;
Note, An Overview of the Insurability of Punitive Damages Under General Liability Poli-
cies, 33 BAYLOR L. REv. 203 (1981); Note, Products Liability and Successor Corporations:
Protecting the Product User and the Small Manufacturer Through Increased Availability
of Products Liability Insurance, 13 U.C.D. L. REv. 1000 (1980); Comment, Solving the
Products Liability Insurance Crisis: A Study of the Role of Economic Theory in the Legis-
lative Reform Process, 31 MERCER L. REv. 755 (1980).
298 [Vol. 16:247
TOXIC SUBSTANCES LITIGATION
like Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Products Corp.,7 1 the producers of
asbestos were held jointly and severally liable for injuries sustained
by a plaintiff because of prolonged exposure to the defendants' as-
bestos. The Fifth Circuit noted in Borel that the damage to the
plaintiff was cumulative and indivisible, that the plaintiff was ex-
posed to asbestos produced by all the defendants, and that each
defendant was the cause in fact of some damage to the plaintiff.7 2
Because the injury was not susceptible of being divided to allocate
responsibility to each defendant, the defendants were jointly and
severally liable and the burden of apportionment of damages was
shifted to the defendants. 37 3
Superimposed on this underlying liability are multiple insurance
policies issued by a variety of insurance companies over a number
of years. The specific language in these policies contains little gui-
dance to solve the problem of which policy or policies provide cov-
erage for an asbestos producer for the indivisible damages awarded
injured plaintiffs. Typically the coverage terms are not materially
different in the policies and the legal debate concerns when "bod-
ily injury" was caused by an "occurrence" so as to trigger cover-
age. 37 4 As may be anticipated, there has been a split in the insur-
ance industry concerning the meaning of this language.375
Companies with coverage when a plaintiff was initially in contact
with asbestos argue that the policy is triggered when asbestosis
"manifests" itself.37l Companies with coverage when a plaintiff's
371. 493 F.2d 1076 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 869 (1974).
372. Id. at 1094.
373. Id.
374. The terms "bodily injury" and "occurrence" were defined by the insurance policy in
Insurance Co. of North America v. Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc., 633 F.2d 1212 (6th Cir.
1980), ,reh. granted, 657 F.2d 814 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 50 U.S.L.W. 3466 (U.S. Dec. 7,
1981) (No. 81-199).
[The Insurer] will pay on behalf of the insured all sums which the insured shall be
legally obligated to pay as damages because of... bodily injury or . . . property
damage to which this policy applies caused by an occurrence. 'Bodily injury' means
bodily injury, sickness or disease sustained by any person which occurs during the
policy period, including death at any time resulting therefrom. 'Occurrence' means an
accident, including injurious exposure to conditions which results, during the policy
period in bodily injury ....
633 F.2d at 1216 (footnotes omitted). The court held that "bodily injury" includes tissue
damage taking place upon inhalation of asbestos. 633 F.2d at 1223.
375. In Eagle-Picher Indus., Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 523 F. Supp. 110, 113 ( D.
Mass. 1981) the court noted: "All parties to this dispute agree that the relevant policy lan-
guage is clear and unambiguous. They disagree as to the meaning of the unambiguous
language. .. "
376. See Insurance Co. of North American v. Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc., 451 F. Supp.
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asbestosis is diagnosed argue that coverage is triggered when there
was "exposure" to asbestos.3 " Courts have generally agreed that
these coverage problems were not contemplated by the parties and
that any potential solution has flaws and anomalies.37 8
There is currently a variety of solutions to these issues that vary
from circuit to circuit.379 The United States Supreme Court, how-
ever, has not granted certiorari in any of these cases.380
The Sixth Circuit has held that an insurance policy is triggered
upon a plaintiff's exposure to asbestos and that, if there are multi-
ple policies in force during the exposure period, then each policy is
responsible for a pro rata share of indemnification of damages
awarded in accordance with the ratio of the years of coverage dur-
ing total proven exposure of the plaintiff to asbestos with the total
number of years of total proven exposure of the plaintiff to asbes-
tos.38 This ratio can be reduced proportionately if the insurance
company can satisfy the burden of proof that the plaintiff suffered
no exposure to asbestos during the time its policies were in ef-
fect.3 8 2 No insurer would be liable "for more than the highest sin-
gle yearly limit in a policy that existed during the period of the
claimant's exposure for which judgment was obtained," 383 and a
self-insured manufacturer would be responsible for a pro rata
share of coverage just like the insurance carriers."" Defense costs
would be handled in the same manner. The dissent in the Forty-
Eight Insulations decision suggested that coverage should be trig-
gered not by exposure, but by "discoverability" of asbestosis, that
could be arbitrarily determined at ten years after initial
1230, 1238 (E.D. Mich. 1978), afl'd, 633 F.2d 1212 (6th Cir. 1980).
377. Id.
378. 633 F.2d at 1226.
379. The issues discussed have included the following: justiciability, conflict of laws, in-
surance coverage and apportionment for damages, manufacturer liability and apportionment
for damages, insurance coverage and apportionment for defense, manufacturer liability and
apportionment for defense, policy deductibles, policy limits, stacking, bad faith claims, and
conflicts of interest.
380. Other than in the Forty-Eight Insulations case, the Court also denied certiorari in
Porter v. American Optical Corp., 641 F.2d 1128 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied sub nom.,
Aetna Life & Cas. Ins. Co., 50 U.S.L.W. 3466 (Dec. 7, 1981) (No. 81-200). The application
for certiorari is pending in Keene Corp. v. Insurance Co. of North America, 50 U.S.L.W.
3489 (No. 81-1012) (D.C. Cir. Nov. 30, 1981).
381. 633 F.2d at 1226.
382. Id. at 1225.
383. Id. at 1226.
384. Id. at 1224.
385. Id.
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exposure. 8
At the opposite extreme, one federal district court has held that
policy coverage is triggered at manifestation of asbestosis- "the
day of actual diagnosis of the asbestos-related disease or, with re-
spect to those in which no diagnosis was made prior to death, the
date of death.38 7 This interpretation of these general comprehen-
sive insurance policies does not necessitate pro rata allocation of
indemnification and defense costs.
Yet another suggested reading has been made by the United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, holding that
"bodily injury" means "any part of the single injurious process
that asbestos-related diseases entail"; that is, exposure, damage
while asbestos is in the lungs, and manifestation. 8 8 Defense costs
would be born by the insurance carriers and allocation among in-
surance carriers would be determined by the "other insurance"
provisions of each policy. 9 A self-insured manufacturer would not
be liable for a pro rata share but would be able to collect under
only one of the potentially applicable policies and only one policy's
limits would apply for each injury.390
Courts that have considered these cases have used a variety of
methods of finding authority for their decisions: medical evidence,
insurance policy language, insurance principles and law, analogous
cases, and public policy and practical ramifications. Medical testi-
mony has been interpreted to support the observation that each
time an asbestos fiber is inhaled, there is a discreet insult or injury
to the lungs.391 Other medical evidence suggests that there is no
immediate damage, but there is a time when exposure to asbestos
results in a discoverable harm or a medically certain diagnosis of
asbestosis 2 Finally, there has been a suggestion that our knowl-
386. Id. at 1230-31 (Merritt, J., dissenting).
387. Eagle-Picher Indus., Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 523 F. Supp. 110, 118 (D. Mass.
1981).
388. Keene Corp. v. Insurance Co. of North America, 667 F.2d 1034, 1047 (D.C. Cir.
1981), petition for cert. filed, 50 U.S.L.W. 3489 (U.S. Nov. 30, 1981) (No. 81-1012).
389. Id. at 1050.
390. Id. at 1050.
391. See Insurance Co. of North America v. Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc., 451 F. Supp.
1230, 1238 (E.D. Mich. 1978). Contrary arguments suggest that tissue damage takes time to
occur, that only some people exposed to asbestos inhale particles into their lungs, that there
may be no tissue damage in some instances, and that there may be no functional impair-
ment of the lungs.
392. Id. Counter arguments suggest that individual determinations may be grossly expen-
sive and that any arbitrary time frame of discoverability is unfair.
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edge and lack of knowledge about the etiology and progress of as-
bestosis comports with a "process" view of the disease."
Aside from the contention that any interpretation of the dis-
puted language must be consistent with the wording and related
provisions of these policies,39 4 there is little guidance available in
the policies themselves for a court to use. The appellants in the
Forty-Eight Insulations case suggested that a literal interpreta-
tion,395 a plain meaning view,398 and the analysis actually used by
insurance companies 39 7 be used as rules of construction. The lack
of specific language to support one analysis or another was also
mentioned by the Sixth Circuit as an interpretive aid.39 8 Decisions
concerning statutes of limitations,99  workers' compensation,
40 0
health and hospital insurance,401 property insurance,40 2 ordinary
accident cases,403 and the underlying theory of liability4  were also
cited by the appellants.
Probably the most influential reference has been to the general
insurance principle that any ambiguity in an insurance policy
should be interpreted to favor the insured to promote indemnity
and coverage. 40 5 At the same time, there is a principle that the re-
alistic expectations of the parties should be given great weight.40"
393. See Keene Corp. v. Insurance Co. of North America, 667 F.2d 1034, 1057 (D.C. Cir.
1981) (Wald, J., concurring). Judge Wald also suggests that the "process-oriented definition
not only provides a flexible formula for adjudicating the legal issues associated with asbes-
tos-related diseases, but also sets a useful precedent for other product-exposure injuries, as
of yet unknown in origin." Id. at 1058.
394. There should be no conflict with other provisions of the policy such as deductibles or
limits. 633 F.2d at 1218.
395. See id. at 1223.
396. See Eagle-Picher Indus., Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 523 F. Supp. 110, 115-16 (D.
Mass. 1981).
397. See Insurance Co. of North America v. Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc., 451 F. Supp.
1230, 1239 (E.D. Mich. 1978).
398. See 633 F.2d at 1222. The policies could have contained, for example, "claims made"
or "discoverability" provisions.
399. Id. at 1220 n.13.
400. Id. at 1221 n.15.
401. Id. 1221 n.17.
402. Id. at 1222 n.18.
403. Id. at 1218.
404. Id. at 1219. Judge Bazelon suggested in one context that "the terms of the policies
incorporate evolving tort doctrines." Keene Corp. v. Insurance Co. of North America, 667
F.2d 1034, 1044 n.20 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
405. See 451 F. Supp. at 1237-38 (citing Tiffany Decorating Co. v. General Accidents Fire
& Life, 12 Ill. App. 3d 597, 299 N.E.2d 318 (1973)); Corbett Co. v. Insurance Co. of North
America, 43 Ill. App. 3d 624, 357 N.E.2d 125 (1976).
406. See Keene Corp. v. Insurance Co. of North America, 667 F.2d 1034, 1041 (D.C. Cir.
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Interestingly these two principles of insurance policy interpreta-
tion may favor opposite conclusions concerning identical policy
language depending upon the underlying coverage situation.0 7
As is the case in most of the difficult decisions concerning toxic
substances, public policy issues and practical ramifications play a
crucial role. High value has been placed upon fairness, 0 8 adminis-
trative feasibility,409 certainty,'410 availability of future insurance
coverage,' 1 and the potential complexity and amount of future lit-
igation. 12 The evolving nature of the law in this area, and in toxic
substances cases in general, has not been conducive, however, to
promoting the public policy of certainty.
XII. CONCLUSION
Whether toxic substances cases are viewed as either a subspecies
of products liability or as a separate category of litigation, there is
little doubt that these cases are straining the existing fabric of the
common law. They raise conflicts among such fundamental values
in our society that the debate over the social policies underlying
these cases will reach new levels of intensity. How the common law
will accommodate the issues raised by toxic substances cases will
be one of the major legal developments over the next decade. In
particular, there will be healthy debate concerning interpretations
of standards of proof, burdens of proof, presumptions and other
decision-making tools of the common law system and various
methods of assimilating and digesting scientific and technological
information and style. As plaintiffs find that the level of uncer-
tainty in resolving issues which are necessary for the establishment
of their case precludes recovery, they will attempt to shift burdens
and presumptions to defendants. Courts, often uncomfortable with
the dilemma of resolving uncertainty by all or nothing solutions,
1981); CoucH ON INSURANCE 2d, § 15:16 (2d ed. Anderson 1959).
407. In Eagle-Picher Indus., Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 523 F. Supp. 110 (D. Mass.
1981), the principles favored a manifestation interpretation because the manufacturer had
no early insurance coverage, while in Insurance Co. of North America v. Forty-Eight Insula-
tions, Inc., 633 F.2d 1212 (6th Cir. 1980), the principles supported an exposure interpreta-
tion because the manufacturer had no current insurance policies.
408. See Keene Corp. v. Insurance Co. of North America, 667 F.2d 1034, 1058 (D.C. Cir.
1981) (Wald, J., concurring).
409. See 633 F.2d at 1218.
410. See Keene Corp. v. Insurance Co. of North America, 667 F.2d 1034, 1041 (D.C. Cir.
1981).
411. Id.
412. See 633 F.2d at 1226.
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will seek alternative methodologies for handling cases.413
Probably the most significant and major problems associated
with toxic substances cases are institutional in nature. Is the jury
capable of resolving complex scientific disputes? Is the common
law system, itself, capable of resolving those disputes? Should
some type of general statutory compensation system be enacted?
If common law courts fail to adapt the law and legal procedures
to the recent developments illustrated by toxic substances cases,
legislators may decide to provide more equitable systems of com-
pensation for injured persons. If common law decisions carry social
policies of compensating injured persons to their logical conclu-
sions and resolve outstanding legal issues by making recovery of
damages by plaintiffs a foregone conclusion, then it should not be
unanticipated that legislatures will enact compensation schemes
that will accomplish the same results more efficiently. If common
law courts are vastly inconsistent in resolving the same issues,
businesses associated with mass produced products will demand a
national standard for what they perceive to be a national prob-
lem.414 The manner of resolution of these and related issues may
well constitute an entire chapter in the history of political and so-
cial developments in this country.
413. A discussion of alternative methodologies is forthcoming from this author.
414. For a consideration of these issues in the context of product liability statutes of re-
pose, see McGovern, supra note 57 at 595.
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